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DEBUNKING THE MYTH OF THE HISTORIC
SUPREMACY OF ANNUAL ACCOUNTING FOR
INCOME TAXES: A COALESCENCE OF
NON-LITERAL INTERPRETATION WITH
ORIGINAL INTENT ANALYSIS
MYRON C. GRAUER*
INTRODUCTION
The statement is often made that our income tax system in the United
States is based upon the concept of annual accounting.1 A more accurate
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This Article is part of a study that I am making of our tax accounting jurisprudence and how it
developed. An earlier article that is part of this study is Grauer, The Supreme Court's Approach to
Annual and Transactional Accountingfor Income Taxes: A Common Law Malfunction in a Statutory
System?, 21 GA. L. REv. 329 (1986). In that article I examined the growth of the Supreme Court
case law in the annual accounting area and the problems which that case law spawned. That article,
however, did not consider whether the statutory and regulatory scheme for tax accounting required
the Court to rule as it did. That article, though, did acknowledge that that question must be ad-
dressed. This Article primarily addresses the question left open in the earlier article and secondarily
posits a proposal for reform with respect to one particular problem in the annual accounting area.
1. See Heiner v. Mellon, 304 U.S. 271, 275 (1938) ("The federal income tax system is based on
annual accounting."). See also Healy v. Commissioner, 345 U.S. 278, 281 (1953) ("One of the basic
aspects of the federal income tax is that there be an annual accounting of income. Each item of
income must be reported in the year in which it is properly reportable and in no other."); Alice
Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399, 403 (Ct. Cl. 1967) ("Ever since Burnet v.
Sanford & Brooks Co.... the concept of accounting for items of income and expense on an annual
basis has been accepted as the basic principle upon which our tax laws are structured." (citations
omitted)); White, An Essay On The Conceptual Foundations Of The Tax Benefit Rule, 82 MIcH. L.
REV. 486,491 (1983) ("ITihe federal income tax system operates on the principle of annual account-
ing .... ); Note, An Asset Based Approach To The Tax Benefit Rule, 72 CAL. L. REv. 1257, 1258
(1984) ("The [tax benefit] rule is necessary because of the interaction between two facets of the
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statement would be that the concept of annual accounting plays a major
role in our income tax culture. Although at first glance the difference
between these two statements might appear to be a minor one of wording
or degree, it is not. The latter statement suggests that annual accounting
is a useful tool in furthering some of the policies that form the basis of
our income tax culture. Such a suggestion invites further inquiry. What
are those policies? Does annual accounting further all of those policies?
If not, when can annual accounting give way to other types of accounting
or analysis in order to further some other important policies without un-
dermining annual accounting's own important policy goals? The first
statement, on the other hand, forecloses further inquiry. By stating that
our tax system is based on annual accounting, it implies that a deviation
from annual accounting could indeed threaten the basis or foundation of
our tax culture and cause the system to fall apart.
"But that is ridiculous!" you might say. "Of course," you would con-
tinue, "no one really believes that our tax system is so based on annual
accounting that we must not countenance any deviation from the con-
cept. Such a belief Would preclude consideration of underlying and per-
haps competing policies in resolving many tax issues. Therefore, anyone
federal income tax system. First the system is based on annual accounting, so that revenue is ascer-
tainable and payable at regular intervals.") The second facet, which the author called "the system's
income orientation," Id. at 1259 (emphasis in original), appears in reality to reflect some of the
equitable issues with which this Article is concerned. Because the author of this Note recognized the
multi-faceted nature of our tax system, perhaps his strong statement that "the system is based on
annual accounting" (emphasis added), can be excused as a slip of the pen. Such slips, however, can
lead readers and courts to assume that the concept of annual accounting must play a more promi-
nent role in our tax system than is necessary or indeed wise.
For additional examples of language indicating that our tax system must always adhere to a con-
cept known as annual accounting, see, United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678, 681 (1969);
Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 321 U.S. 281, 285-87 (1944); Burnet v. Thompson Oil &
Gas Co., 283 U.S. 301, 306 (1931); United States v. Rexach, 482 F.2d 10, 22, 23 (Ist Cir. 1973).
With respect to the definition of the term "annual accounting," the following statement by one
commentator will suffice for the present:
There are two primary accounting approaches to the computation of income tax: the
transactional method and the annual method. The transactional accounting approach
treats each transaction separately; thus, the income from each transaction is determined
only upon completion of the transaction. In contrast, under the annual approach, taxable
income is computed on the basis of the income and expenses resulting from all of the
taxpayer's transactions during a single year, including transactions not completed in that
year. The annual approach thus makes it possible to recoguize income in one year on a
transaction that ultimately results in an over-all loss.
Note, Income Tax-Recovered Property Previously Deducted Included in Income in Year of Recov-
ery-Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 66 MICH. L. REv. 381, 382-83 (1967). A more
detailed exposition of the concept of annual accounting is presented infra Part I, especially from text
accompanying note 31 to the end of Part I.
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who says that our tax system is based on annual accounting cannot really
mean what he says. He must mean that annual accounting merely plays
a major role in our tax culture. Otherwise, annual accounting would be
regarded not as a tool for furthering various policies, but rather as an end
in itself that must be attained. Such an approach would turn tax policy
on its head and sometimes lead either to questionable results or to proper
results that are justified by questionable reasoning."
Well, your analysis is correct, but your conclusion is not. For over
half a century, starting with the landmark case of Burnet v. Sanford &
Brooks Co. 2, the United States Supreme Court acted as if the annual ac-
counting concept were the basis or foundation of our income tax system.3
In all fairness, I cannot accuse the Court of completely failing to recog-
nize the policies that actually form the basis of our income tax culture.4
2. 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
3. See generally Grauer, The Supreme Court's Approach to Annual and Transactional Account-
ing For Income Taxes: A Common Law Malfunction in a Statutory System?, 21 GA. L. RaV. 329
(1986).
The following language from the Sanford & Brooks opinion exemplifies the Court's belief that our
income tax system is based upon annual accounting.
A taxpayer may be in receipt of net income in one year and not in another. The net result
of the two years, if combined in a single taxable period, might still be a loss; but it has never
been supposed that that fact would relieve him from a tax on the first, or that it affords any
reason for postponing the assessment of the tax until the end of a lifetime, or for some
other indefinite period, to ascertain more precisely whether the final outcome of the period,
or of a given transaction, will be a gain or a loss.
The Sixteenth Amendment was adopted to enable the government to raise revenue by
taxation. It is the essence of any system of taxation that it should produce revenue ascer-
tainable, and payable to the government, at regular intervals. Only by such a system is it
practicable to produce a regular flow of income and apply methods of accounting, assess-
ment, and collection capable of practical operation. It is not suggested that there has ever
been any general scheme for taxing income on any other basis .... While conceivably, a
different system might be devised by which the tax could be assessed, wholly or in part, on
the basis of the finally ascertained results of particular transactions, Congress is not re-
quired by the Amendment to adopt such a system in preference to the more familiar
method, even if it were practicable.
282 US. at 364-65.
4. A classic work on the policies underlying our income tax culture is Sneed, The Criteria of
Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L. REV. 567 (1965). Professor (now Judge) Sneed states that
the policies shaping our income tax culture are the following: (1) supplying adequate revenue;
(2) achieving a practical and workable tax system; (3) imposing equal taxes upon those who enjoy
equal incomes (also known as the concept of "horizontal equity"); (4) assisting in achieving eco-
nomic stability; (5) reducing economic inequality (closely related to a concept known as "vertical
equity"); (6) avoiding the impairment of a free-market economy; and (7) accomplishing harmony
between the income tax and the desired political order. Id. at 568.
I have also stated, and continue to state in this Article, that three paramount goals of our tax
system are: (1) providing equitable treatment to both the taxpayer and the government; (2) protect-
ing the federal fisc from depletion by taxpayer manipulation; and (3) raising revenue in an adminis-
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Rather, I accuse the Court of placing greater importance on promoting
the notion that our tax system is based upon annual accounting than on
properly balancing and considering the underlying and competing poli-
cies of our tax system in a rational and coherent manner. In other
words, the Court was keeping its eye on the wrong ball. Instead of reach-
ing results in a manner that demonstrated a proper balancing of underly-
ing, and perhaps competing, tax policies (making use of the annual
accounting concept when appropriate), the Court appeared willing to
reach results that properly balanced competing tax policy goals only so
long as any threat to the supremacy of annual accounting could be
thwarted.' In some cases the tax policy goal of equitable treatment of
taxpayers and the government 6 suffered unduly.7 In other cases, the
tratively feasible manner. See Grauer, supra note 3, at 338. The first of these goals is analogous to,
but also broader than, Sneed's third policy criterion of horizontal equity. See infra note 6. The
second and third goals combine Sneed's first two policy criteria, adequacy and practicality. As this
Article and Sneed both note, these policies, goals, or criteria can often conflict with one another. For
example, Sneed states, "Practicality often infringes upon Equity." Sneed, supra at 574. For a more
recent statement noting the conflict among these goals see Simon, Tax Simplification and Justice, 36
TAX NOTES 93, 93 (1987) ("Indeed, it has become generally accepted that the goals of fairness,
simplicity, and efficiency frequently may conflict, which results in the need to choose among unpop-
ular alternatives.").
5. See generally Grauer, supra note 3.
6. The goal of equitable treatment of taxpayers and the government is difficult to describe or
define with much precision. Nevertheless, I have attempted previously to give content to this
concept:
The terms "equitable treatment [of] both the taxpayer and the government" and "eq-
uity" are admittedly nebulous terms that connote the concept of fairness. While no at-
tempt is made at formulating precise definitions in this article, the reader may wish to
consider the following thoughts in evaluating whether a result provides equitable treatment
to both the taxpayer and the government.
Tax policy analysts often use the term "equity" to mean "horizontal equity" (i.e., tax-
payers with similar incomes should face similar tax bills) or "vertical equity" (i.e., taxpay-
ers with larger incomes should pay proportionately more in taxes than taxpayers with
smaller incomes). The term "equity" as used in the article, however, is much broader in
scope. It includes the notion that we must be very concerned by a tax system in which the
tax liabilities of two taxpayers over an extended period of time may depend as much on the
period during which an item of income is recognized as they do on the amount of income
received. "Equity" additionally encompasses the concept of Code symmetry, which at-
tempts to limit deductions to dollars that have already been subject to tax, and to require
the inclusion in income of the receipt of all dollars that have once been the subject of a
deduction by the taxpayer. The concept of Code symmetry is closely related to the pro-
scription against impermissible double tax benefits; for example, a taxpayer should not be
permitted to deduct the same dollars twice.
The astute observer may already have noticed that some aspects of the notion of equity
can conflict with one another. For example, the Code symmetry requirement that we in-
clude in income the receipt of all dollars that have been the subject of a deduction may
indeed cause a tax liability to depend as much on the period during which an item is
recognized as on the total amount of income received. Thus, a balancing of competing
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss1/6
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Court did attain equitable results, but not before it either engaged in
mental gymnastics to avoid potential accusations that it was undermin-
ing the supremacy of annual accounting,' or defined the parameters of
the concept of annual accounting so broadly that it could disingenuously
claim it was engaging in annual accounting when in fact it was not.9 The
result was an overemphasis upon adherence to annual accounting and an
unrealistic tax jurisprudence.
What could cause the Supreme Court to do such a thing? Part of the
answer may lie in the language of our tax statutes. Section 441(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code states that "[tiaxable income shall be computed
on the basis of the taxpayer's taxable year.""0 Furthermore, section 11,
in imposing the corporate tax makes reference to the use of a taxable
year,11 and section 162 allows deductions for ordinary and necessary
policies or goals is required to achieve true equity, and the concept itself remains somewhat
nebulous.
Grauer, supra note 3, at 338 n.23.
7. See United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951). In Lewis, the taxpayer received monies
under a claim of right and reported it as income in 1944. In 1946, he returned the money to his
employer. The Court held that because of the annual accounting requirement, the taxpayer could
not amend his return for 1944, but had to claim a deduction in 1946. Apparently because the tax-
payer's marginal rate was lower in 1946 than in 1944, the tax saved in 1946 from the deduction did
not equal the tax paid in 1944 from the inclusion in income. Thus, strict adherence to annual ac-
counting led to the inequitable result of the taxpayer effectively paying some tax on money he was
not ultimately permitted to keep. For a more detailed analysis of the Lewis case, and of how the
Court in Lewis applied annual accounting principles without considering the purposes those princi-
ples are intended to serve, see Grauer, supra note 3, at 352-57.
8. See Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943). In Dobson, the Court affirmed the
transactional exclusionary aspect of the tax benefit rule only in dicta by first denying that it was
adopting "any rule of tax benefits" and then limiting its holding to that the lower court improperly
treated as a rule of law what the Court claimed was only a question of fact. Id. at 506-07. For a
more detailed exposition of the mental gymnastics of the Dobson Court, see Grauer, supra note 3, at
373-79.
9, See United States v. Skelly Oil Co., 394 U.S. 678 (1969); Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344
U.S. 6 (1952). In both cases the Court denied that it was violating annual accounting even though it
permitted events in years other than the tax year in question to affect that year's tax results. For a
more detailed analysis see Grauer, supra note 3, at 360-71.
10. I.R.C. § 441(a) (West Supp. 1988). Section 441(a) and its requirement of an annual ac-
counting for income taxes is buttressed by § 45 1(a) which provides: "The amount of any item of
gross income shall be included in the gross income for the taxable year in which received by the
taxpayer, unless, under the method of accounting used in computing taxable income, such amount is
to be properly accounted for as of a different period." I.R.C. § 451(a) (West Supp. 1988). Similarly,
on the deduction side, § 461(a) provides: "The amount of any deduction or credit allowed by this
subtitle shall be taken for the taxable year which is the proper taxable year under the method of
accounting used in computing taxable income." I.R.C. § 461(a) (West Supp. 1988).
11. Section 11(a) provides: "A tax is hereby imposed for each taxable year on the taxable
income of every corporation." I.R.C. § 11(a) (West Supp. 1988).
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business expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year. 2 These sec-
tions clearly mandate that an annual accounting system be employed by
each taxpayer, and the early Revenue Acts contained similar provi-
sions.13 These annual accounting sections, however, constitute only a
small portion of the complex web of statutory and regulatory provisions
which forms the basis of our income tax system. Because of the web's
complexity, no one section or regulation or even set of sections or regula-
tions can be analyzed properly in isolation. Rather, each section or reg-
ulation or set of sections or regulations must be analyzed and evaluated
with regard to the policies that they further and with regard to compet-
ing policies and considerations that are evidenced by other sections or
regulations. Only by so balancing and considering competing underlying
policies can a court interpret and apply Code provisions in a rational and
coherent manner. 14
12. Section 162(a) provides in pertinent part: "There shall be allowed as a deduction all the
ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business ..... I.R.C. § 162(a) (West Supp. 1988).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 39-46.
14. A recent article supports this approach to interpreting Internal Revenue Code provisions.
See Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code, 64 N.C.L.
REv. 623 (1986). Professor Zelenak states:
[The very complexity of the Code may give the Code more in the way of underlying
structures and permeating policies than most other statutes. These structures, policies, and
principles can be discovered--sometimes easily, sometimes with great difficulty and uncer-
tainty-through a thoughtful reading and study of the Code as a whole.
Id. at 639. Furthermore, Zelenak states:
It is generally accepted that particular words in a statute should not be read in isolation;
rather, they must be understood in the context of the statute in which they appear. The
relevant context is both internal (the entire statute in which the particular words to be
interpreted appear) and external (the legislative history, the conditions to which the statute
was a response, and the like.)
Id. at 637.
I go somewhat further in this Article than does Professor Zelenak in advocating nonliteral inter-
pretation. Professor Zelenak adheres to the principle that great deference should be accorded to how
Treasury regulations interpret the Code. He states:
[Tlhe existence of an interpretive regulation should be decisive in a case in which an inter-
pretive regulation is appropriate and in which reasonable arguments can be made both for
a literal interpretation and for a nonliteral contextual interpretation. If the regulation rea-
sonably adopts a nonliteral interpretation, a court should defer to the regulation, even if
the court otherwise would have preferred a literal interpretation. If, instead, the regulation
reasonably adopts a literal interpretation, the court likewise should defer, even if the court
otherwise would have favored a nonliteral interpretation. The existence of a regulation
enables the government to prevail so long as its regulatory interpretation is reasonable, and
a regulatory interpretation may be reasonable even though it is not 6ne the court would
have reached in the absence of the regulation.
Id. at 673-74. In this Article I take the position that the regulations, as well as the statutory provi-
sions, should be evaluated in the context of the underlying structures, policies and principles of the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss1/6
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The Supreme Court, however, placed such great importance upon hav-
ing its decisions comport with the concept of annual accounting for two
interrelated reasons. First, the Court failed to consider the annual ac-
counting provisions of the Code in light of the various policies evidenced
by the statutory and regulatory scheme which forms the basis of our in-
come tax accounting system. Second, in Sanford & Brooks, the Court
misinterpreted key statutory provisions as placing greater emphasis on
adherence to annual accounting than Congress had ever intended. In-
deed, a careful examination of the development of the statutory and regu-
latory scheme for accounting for income demonstrates that the scheme
developed not out of any well-conceived plan to promote a particular
system of accounting, but rather through trial and error. The goal of this
trial and error system was to raise revenue in an administratively feasible
manner without sacrificing two other paramount goals: (1) providing eq-
uitable treatment to both the taxpayer and the government, and (2) pro-
tecting the federal fisc from depletion by taxpayer manipulation. In
developing a statutory scheme to further all these goals, Congress, in
some cases, enacted legislation that certainly does comport with the con-
cept of annual accounting.15 In other cases, however, Congress furthered
these goals through legislation that definitely does not comport with the
concept of annual accounting.16 The conclusion to be drawn is that Con-
gress merely regarded annual accounting as a useful tool in its trial and
income tax system as a whole and in light of the conditions to which those regulations were a
response. Thus, even if a regulation which adopts a literal interpretation of a Code provision consti-
tutes a reasonable interpretation of the Code language in question, a court should not blindly accept
that regulation. A court should consider whether adherence to that regulation conflicts with some
policies or principles that underlie the tax system and whether the regulation was a response to, or
promulgated under, conditions that are vastly different from those in existence when the issue comes
before the court.
In some respects my approach to regulatory evaluation could be deemed a natural outgrowth from
Dean Calabresi's view of how courts should evaluate statutory provisions. Calabresi sees "the com-
mon law function to be exercised by courts today... [as] ... the judgmental function... of deciding
when a rule has come to be sufficiently out of phase with the whole legal framework so that,
whatever its age, it can stand only if a current majoritarian or representative body reaffirms it." G.
CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 164 (1982). The approach to regulatory
evaluation suggested here simply extends Dean Calabresi's statutory evaluation approach to the field
of regulatory evaluation so that a court should strike down a regulatory provision if, in Calabresi's
words, it "has come to be sufficiently out of phase with the whole legal framework."
15. See, e.g., supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 172 (West Supp. 1988) (net operating loss carryback and carryforward);
I.R.C. §§ 453-453C (West Supp. 1988 as amended by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-
514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2365-72) (installment sales); I.R.C. § 1341 (West Supp. 1988) (repayment by
taxpayer of substantial amounts previously reported under claim of right).
1989]
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error approach to revenue raising and never intended for the concept of
annual accounting to achieve the status that the Supreme Court granted
it.
The purpose of this Article is to prove the foregoing thesis by examin-
ing in detail the early history of the statutory and regulatory scheme for
income tax accounting. If the examination demonstrates that from the
earliest years of income taxation after passage of the sixteenth amend-
ment,1 7 Congress either countenanced or promulgated transactional or
other non-annual methods of accounting, then it is highly doubtful that
Congress intended for the Court to emphasize adherence to annual ac-
counting in the manner that it did. Furthermore, if the examination
demonstrates that these inroads upon annual accounting resulted from
an effort to achieve goals that conflict somewhat with the policies and
goals of annual accounting, then the Court should have considered how
annual accounting affected these other goals or policies in its decision-
making process.
Admittedly, such an approach requires balancing some competing pol-
icy goals. If a historical review indicates that the Court should have, but
did not, engage in such balancing, perhaps some aspects of current law
should be revised to reflect a better balance among competing policy
goals. Such a revision can be justified on two grounds: (1) it would bring
current law into greater harmony with the balance among competing
policies that Congress historically desired; and (2) it could indicate to
courts the importance of balancing the goals of annual accounting
17. Of course, the history of the income tax in the United States did not begin with the six-
teenth amendment. The first federal income tax appeared during the Civil War and continued until
its repeal in 1872. Act of Aug. 5, 1861, ch. 45, 12 Stat. 292 (income tax), repealed by Act of June 6,
1872, ch. 315, 17 Stat. 230. In response to populist pressures from the emerging western states, the
tax was revived in 1894 as a means of forcing the wealthy to contribute more to the public fisc. See
generally D. PosIN, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 3-8 (1983) for a brief history of federal income
taxation. See also Act of Aug. 27, 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509 (1894). However, the Supreme Court
found the 1894 tax unconstitutional in Pollack v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Company, 157 U.S. 429
(1895). As a result of that decision, a federal income tax did not become a permanent fixture until
the passage of the sixteenth amendment in 1913. Thus, it is impossible to examine the history of the
tax as a continuum prior to the passage of the sixteenth amendment, and it is very difficult to draw
conclusions as to Congress' intent as it developed prior to that time. Furthermore, in justifying strict
adherence to annual accounting, the Supreme Court in Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S.
359, 363 (1931) referred only to "the revenue acts which have been enacted since the adoption of the
sixteenth amendment." 282 U.S. at 363. For these reasons our examination of the early history will
begin with the passage of the sixteenth amendment and will ignore the income tax as it existed prior
to that time.
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against other policy considerations in reaching decisions, thus leading to
a more principled and realistic tax jurisprudence.
Recognition of the need to balance the goals of annual accounting
against other policy considerations is not without precedent. Twenty
years ago, a proposal was made"8 that could have provided a meaningful
first step toward recognition of the importance of policies other than
those promoted by annual accounting. Fairly recently, in Hillsboro Na-
tional Bank v. Commissioner,9 the Court itself took a tentative step to-
ward a more realistic tax jurisprudence.2" However, an observer is
forced to wonder whether at this late date in the development of the law
the Court feels free to do any more than take tentative steps.21 Since the
Court first interpreted the statutory and regulatory scheme for tax ac-
counting in a manner that overemphasized adherence to annual account-
ing, Congress has changed the statutory topography.22 Therefore, the
Court will probably never get the opportunity to reevaluate its earlier
interpretations. As a result, Congressional adoption of a proposal along
the lines of that posited some twenty years ago may indeed be one way to
begin the balancing process. In an effort to prove that such proposals fit
properly within the original intent of Congress in developing our tax ac-
counting system, this Article examines in some detail the early history of
our tax accounting system. In addition, this Article presents a somewhat
similar proposal for reform, not as the overall solution to the problem,
but rather as a step in the right direction that would alleviate one partic-
ular inequity arising from strict adherence to annual accounting. Before
18. Note, The Tax Benefit Rule, Claim of Right Restorations and Annual Accounting A Cure
for the Inconsistencies, 21 VAND. L. REV. 995 (1968).
19. 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
20. See Grauer, supra note 3, at 391-92 where I discuss the significance of the Hillsboro Court's
statement that the tax benefit rule is "to approximate the results produced by... transactional...
accounting." 460 U.S. at 381.
21. As to whether Hillsbor could be used as an overall entr6 toward a more realistic tax juris-
prudence because it recognizes a role for transactional accounting, we must bear in mind that Hills-
boro dealt with the tax benefit rule. I have earlier stated:
[B]ecause the tax benefit rule has already been accepted [by commentators] as an aspect of
our tax system that involves transactional accounting, Hillsboro's recognition of the limits
of annual accounting and the benefits of approximating transactional accounting might be
limited to tax benefit rule cases and thus not deemed of great precedential value with re-
spect to other tax issues.
Grauer, supra note 3, at 393. Therefore, the Court may not believe that language in Hillsboro recog-
nizing a role for transactional accounting is sufficient to overcome years of earlier precedent that
rejected a role for a transactional approach to accounting in cases that did not involve the tax benefit
rule fact pattern.
22. See infra note 285 and accompanying text.
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examining the early history of our tax accounting system, however, this
Article will first explore the parameters of annual accounting and some
policies it furthers as well as some policies furthered by other types of
accounting or analyses.
Examination of these policies, however, will be limited to that appro-
priate to the doctrinal/historical examination that this Article is pursu-
ing. Accounting issues, of course, can be examined through
methodologies other than the historical one employed here. Recent arti-
cles have examined current accounting issues through the use of eco-
nomic and financial models.23 As this Article's purpose is mainly to
determine if historically Congress desired annual accounting to be tem-
pered by some policies that conflict with those behind annual accounting,
this Article will forego the use of economic and financial models in favor
of an examination of the historical context in which the early annual
accounting provisions developed in the statutory and regulatory scheme.
The decision not to engage in economic and financial modeling in this
Article is also justified by the fact that this Article will be evaluating
whether courts engaged in a proper balancing of policy goals in an era
before the legal literature contained today's economic and financial mod-
eling. It is thus only fair to those courts to evaluate what they were
doing in the context of the information available to them at that time.
I. THE CONCEPTS AND GOALS OF ANNUAL AND NON-ANNUAL
ACCOUNTING SYSTEMS OR ANALYSES
The concept of annual accounting and the policies that it furthers must
be juxtaposed against the concepts of lifetime or transactional accounting
and the policies they further. The United States Treasury Department's
Tax Policy Staff has acknowledged, "Ideally, two taxpayers should be
compared on the basis of a whole lifetime of circumstances, and this is
taken here to be a general goal of tax system design: lifetime tax burden
should depend upon lifetime circumstances."'24 Such an approach recog-
nizes that accounting for taxes over shorter periods of time may distort
23. See, e-g., Gunn, Matching of Costs and Revenues as a Goal of Tax Accounting, 4 VA. TAX
REv. 1 (1984); Halperin & Klein, Tax Accounting for Future Obligations: Basic Principles Revised,
38 TAX NOTES 831 (1988); Klein, Tax Accounting for Future Obligations: Basic Principles, 36 TAX
NOTES 623 (1987).
24. D. BRADFORD, BLUEPRINTS FOR BAsic TAX REFORM 24 (2d ed. 1984) (emphasis in origi-
nal) (While this book, which first appeared in print in 1977, was principally authored by David
Bradford, who was Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy in the Ford adminis-
tration, it represents a team effort by the Treasury's Tax Policy Staff during the Ford administration.
[Vol. 67:165
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one's true income picture and produce inequities. For example, suppose
a taxpayer incurred all his expenses in generating income during his life-
time in one accounting period, and received all his lifetime income in
another accounting period. The inability to offset the income with the
expenditures, as a result of having two separate accounting periods,
would subject the taxpayer to a higher lifetime tax than if the expendi-
tures and income receipt had occurred in the same accounting period.
Thus, the most equitable way to tax two people who have similar in-
comes over time is to avoid the use of artificial accounting periods and
calculate one's lifetime tax after determining one's lifetime income.
Such an approach, however, would be disastrous to the government.
Although similar treatment of similarly situated taxpayers is a desirable
goal for an income tax system, an income tax system must also raise
revenue in a predictable and administratively feasible manner.25 If in-
come taxes were based solely upon one's lifetime income, the govern-
ment, not knowing who might die at any given time, could not estimate
how much revenue it would receive during any particular time period.
Furthermore, even if the government could predict its revenue entitle-
ments by combining census and mortality data, the chances of collecting
the revenue to which it was entitled would be rather slim. Quite likely,
most estates would not contain sufficient assets to satisfy a decedent's
lifetime tax bill. Thus, the use of accounting periods, and indeed an an-
nual accounting system, has been deemed "a practical necessity if the
federal income tax is to produce revenue ascertainable and payable at
regular intervals."26
When viewed in the context of an average lifetime, an annual account-
ing period is rather short. Additionally, a leading tax theorist recognized
some time ago that the shorter accounting periods are, and the more
rigidly they are adhered to, the more likely it is that complexities and
Statements contained in the book can therefore be deemed those of the Treasury's Tax Policy Staff at
that time).
25. See, for example, Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931) where the Court
stated:
The Sixteenth Amendment was adopted to enable the government to raise revenue by taxa-
tion. It is the essence of any system of taxation that it should produce revenue ascertain-
able, and payable to the government, at regular intervals. Only by such a system is it
practicable to produce a regular flow of income and apply methods of accounting, assess-
ment, and collection capable of practical operation.
282 U.S. at 365.
26. Hillsboro National Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 377 (1983).
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inequities will result.2 7 For example, a construction contract that takes
several years to complete may not result in an overall profit, but under
annual accounting this contract may give rise to income subject to taxa-
tion if the taxpayer receives payments on the contract in a different year
than he incurs the offsetting expenditures.28 The question thus arises
whether both equity and the need for collecting revenues on a regular
and foreseeable basis could be satisfied by imposing taxes on the results
of discrete transactions, rather than on the basis of annual accounting
periods.
The problem with this transactional approach is that the duration of
transactions varies so widely that the government may find it difficult to
predict its revenue flow. Additionally, the absence of a definite time pe-
riod for accounting for taxes could induce taxpayers to extend the dura-
tion of various transactions or to convert several shorter transactions into
one lengthy transaction in order to obtain the time value of money.
Thus, discrete accounting time periods are indeed necessary because they
enable the government to predict and obtain revenues at regular intervals
and to preclude certain manipulations of the system by taxpayers.
By the same token, limitations on the employment of annual account-
ing are necessary because they minimize inequities such as those in the
example above.2 9 Furthermore, some limitations may be necessary to
27. See H. SiMoNs, FEDERAL TAX REFORM 59-60 (1950). Henry Simons stated:
[Good income tax accounting or] procedure must not require or presuppose sharp alloca-
tions of income among short accounting periods.... [Tax legislation calling for definitive
annual determinations means awful complexity, difficult administration, expensive compli-
ance, endless litigation, and bad taxpayer and Bureau morale. Like it or not, we must
recognize that good income taxation is not merely a succession of events in or respecting
discrete, water-tight accounting periods but is essentially process through time. Its objec-
tives must be defined and pursued with respect to long periods, often the taxpayer's whole
lifetime .... Income taxation has simply never faced squarely the axiom that annual-
accounting is and should be tentative and provisional.
28. Indeed, this is exactly what occurred in Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359
(1931) where the Court held that the taxpayer could not offset income it received in 1920 against
losses it incurred in 1913, 1915 and 1916, even though the earlier losses and the later income all
arose out of the same transaction. The transaction on the whole, was not a profitable one, and the
earlier losses had not generated any tax benefit for the taxpayer. Under the Revenue Act of 1918 the
only losses that a taxpayer could carry forward to offset 1920 income were losses incurred in taxable
years beginning after October 31, 1918 and ending prior to January 1, 1920. See Revenue Act of
1918, ch. 18, § 204(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1061 (1919). Therefore, no loss carry over provision was
available to the taxpayer in Sanford & Brooks to protect it from the inequitable and harsh result that
flowed from strict application of annual accounting.
29. An example of such an inequity exists where the tax system imposes a tax on the proceeds
from a long term contract that does not result in a gain. See supra note 28. See also infra Part II. B.
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preclude manipulations of the system by taxpayers. 30 As a result, Con-
gress and the courts have at times tempered the use of annual accounting
with non-annual or transactional accounting.3"
In order to recognize when the use of annual accounting is tempered
or encroached upon, one must understand the requirements of annual
accounting. One commentator has described annual accounting as re-
quiring "all taxpayers to calculate their taxable income on an annual ba-
sis in light of the facts known to them at the time of filing. Strictly
applied, annual accounting treats each year as a discrete unit.",32 Ac-
cording to another commentator, a pure theory of annual accounting
'requires disregarding the factors of prior or subsequent taxable years,
despite their relation to the year in question. ' 33 In other words, pure
annual accounting determines taxable income by netting the actual or
accrued receipts of a yearly period against the actual or accrued deducti-
ble expenses in that same yearly period, without any regard to the trans-
actions which gave rise to those receipts or expenditures.
Because a taxpayer often receives income as a result of transactions or
events that occur in years other than the year of receipt, strict adherence
to annual accounting not only might produce inequitable or manipulative
results, but also would produce a system of accounting for taxes that
bore no relationship to reality. Thus, our tax accounting system, in order
to be realistic, does consider events that occur in years other than the
year of the receipt or deduction in question. However, it is a misnomer
to call that aspect of our accounting system an aspect which comports
with the concept of annual accounting.
More accurately, any aspect of our accounting system that considers
events occurring in other years, whether for the purpose of bringing real-
30. See Grauer, supra note 3, at 364-67 (description of how taxpayers situated similarly to those
in Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952) could have used strict adherence to annual ac-
counting to reap an undeserved windfall through abusive premature liquidations of closely held
corporations that faced contingent liabilities).
3 1. See supra note 16 for some examples of congressional tempering of strict adherence to an-
nual accounting through the promulgation of transactional or non-annual accounting provisions.
The courts have also used non-annual or transactional accounting or analysis. See, e.g., Arrowsmith
v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952) (if a transaction in one year is so integrally related to a transac-
tion in an earlier year that they are in effect part and parcel of the same transaction, the manner in
which the earlier year's transaction was characterized should affect the manner in which the later
year's transaction is characterized); Dobson v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 489 (1943) (the transactional
exclusionary aspect of the tax benefit rule could apply in situations not specifically enumerated by
Congress).
32. White, supra note 1, at 492.
33. See Note, supra note 18, at 995.
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ity to the system, making it more equitable, or precluding manipulation
of the system by taxpayers, should be described as a transactional incur-
sion into annual accounting's domain. Also, it is far more accurate to
describe an accounting system that tempers the problems presented by
pure annual accounting with transactional elements as a hybrid system
rather than as an annual accounting system. Acceptance of the system as
hybrid could free the courts from the need to justify their decisions as
comporting with the concept of annual accounting. If this occurred,
courts could concentrate on reaching results by properly balancing un-
derlying policy goals, and thereby draft more lucid opinions. An exami-
nation of the history of the governing statutory and regulatory scheme
for tax accounting will reveal whether this is what Congress originally
intended.
II. THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY
SCHEME OF ACCOUNTING FOR INCOME: AN
UNSTEADY GROWTH
Ever since the Income Tax Law of 1913, 34 which was the first income
tax act promulgated pursuant to the sixteenth amendment, taxpayers
have accounted for income on an annual basis. However, what began
simply as a requirement that taxpayers account for income and pay taxes
on a regular basis grew quickly into a statutory and regulatory scheme
that evidenced somewhat contradictory policies. Prior to the Revenue
Act of 1918,3 5 which was enacted in 1919,36 the income tax statutes were
relatively simple documents, and the requirement of accounting for in-
come on an annual basis was woven into the statutes in a manner that did
not belabor the point. With the Revenue Act of 1918, the income tax
statutes took on a new and much more technically complex form. In this
new format, Congress emphasized the existence of annual accounting in
an affirmative manner and, for the first time, described in some detail the
requirements of annual accounting. However, by the end of 1918, prior
to final enactment of the Revenue Act of 1918, detailed requirements of
annual accounting had already begun to appear in the Treasury Regula-
tions. 37 At about the same time, however, certain statutory and regula-
tory provisions appeared which did not comport with the concept of
34. Ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 114, 166-81 (1913).
35. Ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057 (1919).
36. Id. (giving enactment date as February 24, 1919).
37. See infra text accompanying notes 51, 55.
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annual accounting.38 A more detailed description of this statutory and
regulatory development will demonstrate the contradictory path along
which the scheme for tax accounting developed.
A. Strict Adherence to Annual Accounting Prior to the Revenue Act of
1918
In a very simple fashion, the Income Tax Law of 1913 wove annual
accounting into provisions that addressed rates, deductions and tax re-
turn computation. Section II.A.l. dealing with rates, provided:
That there shall be levied, assessed, collected and paid annually upon the
entire net income arising or accruing from all sources in the preceding cal-
endar year to every citizen of the United States, whether residing at home
or abroad, and to every person residing in the United States, though not a
citizen thereof, a tax of 1 per centum per annum upon such income, except
as hereinafter provided; and a like tax shall be assessed, levied, collected,
and paid annually upon the entire net income from all property owned and
of every business, trade, or profession carried on in the United States by
persons residing elsewhere. 39
Section II.B. dealing with deductions, provided in pertinent part:
That in computing net income for the purpose of the normal tax there shall
be allowed as deductions: First, the necessary expenses actually paid in
carrying on any business, not including personal, living, or family expenses;
second, all interest paid within the year by a taxable person on indebtedness;
third, all national, State, county, school, and municipal taxes paid within
the year, not including those assessed against local benefits; fourth, losses
actually sustained during the year, incurred in trade or arising from fires,
storms, or shipwreck, and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise;
fifth, debts due to the taxpayer actually ascertained to be worthless and
charged off within the year; sixth . .40
Additionally, Section II.D., pertaining to tax return computations pro-
vided in pertinent part, "The said tax shall be computed upon the re-
mainder of said net income of each person subject thereto, accruing
during each preceding calendar year ending December thirty-first....
Section II.G.(a) made the foregoing provisions applicable to corporate
taxpayers.42 As these provisions illustrate, the first income tax act
38. See infra Parts II. B. & C. and Part III.
39. 38 Stat. at 166 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 167 (emphasis added).
41. Id. at 168 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 172.
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promulgated under the sixteenth amendment called for an annual ac-
counting system without being heavy-handed.
Congress continued this approach to an annual accounting system in
the Revenue Act of 1916.1' With regard to the emphasis placed on an-
nual accounting, the Act's sections on deductions, both individual and
corporate, were not substantially different from Section II.B. of the In-
come Tax Law of 1913.14 The sections of the 1916 Act dealing with tax
rates and tax return computation, however, contained a very subtle
change from their counterparts in the 1913 Law. The 1916 rate sections,
section 1(a) for individuals and section 10 for corporations, both pro-
vided in pertinent part: "[T]here shall be levied, assessed, collected, and
paid annually upon the entire net income received in the preceding calen-
dar year from all sources.., a tax of two per centum upon such in-
come.... ."5 Additionally, the 1916 return computation sections, section
8(a) for individuals and section 13(a) for corporations, provided in perti-
nent part: "The tax shall be computed upon the net income, as thus
ascertained,. . . received in each preceding calendar year. .... 146 The
subtle change was the use of the word "received" in these sections. The
counterpart to these sections in the 1913 Law had used the term "accru-
ing" to describe the time when items would be accounted.
One could easily read the word "received" in the later Revenue Act of
1918 to indicate the importance of adherence to annual accounting.47
Therefore, use of the more specific word, "received," in the 1916 Act
43. Ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756 (1916).
44. See Ch. 463, § 5(a), 39 Stat. 756, 759 (1916) (deductions for individuals); Ch. 463, § 12, 39
Stat. at 767-70 (deductions for corporations).
45. Ch. 463, § l(a), 39 Stat. 756; Ch. 463, § 10, 39 Stat. 765 (emphasis added with respect to
both sections).
46. Ch 463, § 8(a), 39 Stat. 761; Ch. 463, § 13(a), 39 Stat. 770 (emphasis added with respect to
both sections).
47. Ch. 463, § 213(a) of the Revenue Act of 1918 provided in part: "The amount of all such
items [which could conceivably encompass gross income] shall be included in the gross income for
the taxable year in which received by the taxpayer, unless, under methods of accounting permitted
under subdivision (b) of section 212, any such amounts are to be properly accounted for as of a
different period,..." Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 213(a), 40 Stat. 1057, 1065 (1919). Subdivision
(b) of § 212 authorized the use of accounting methods other than cash basis. Therefore, the word
"received" in § 213(a) could have been used simply to denote cash basis accounting, just as it was in
the 1916 Act. See infra note 48 and accompanying text. However, the syntax and tone of § 213(a)
of the 1918 Act is so different from that of §§ l(a), 8(a), 10(a), and 13(a) of the 1916 Act, see supra
text accompanying notes 45, 46, that the word "received" and the language of § 213(a) take on an
added connotation: unless a taxpayer is using a special method of accounting authorized by § 212(b)
items shall be included in income and accounted for only in the year of receipt. Interpreting § 213(a)
as emphasizing such a requirement for strict adherence to annual accounting is not unwarranted.
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could have indicated a subtle Congressional shift toward emphasizing a
system of annual accounting. That was not, however, the reason for this
rewording. Rather, as Professor Gunn has noted, this rewording enabled
Congress to distinguish between cash and accrual basis accounting and
to introduce the concept of accrual basis accounting to the tax laws
through sections 8(g) and 13(d) of the 1916 Act.48 Nonetheless, because
the Revenue Act of 1918 did use the word "received" in a manner that
indicated the importance of adherence to annual accounting,4 9 conceiva-
bly the Treasury, anticipating the 1918 Act, believed that use of the word
"received" in the 1916 Act authorized it to take a more aggressive ap-
proach toward requiring strict adherence to annual accounting in regula-
tions under the 1916 Act than it had taken in regulations under the 1913
Law. As discussed below, however, the Treasury's more aggressive ap-
proach toward annual accounting resulted from more than simply the
appearance of the word "received" in the 1916 Act.
Unlike the language of the 1916 Act itself, the regulations promul-
gated pursuant to the 1916 Act were in some ways quite heavy-handed in
their approach to annual accounting. Article 110 of Regulation 33,
promulgated pursuant to the Revenue Act of 1916,50 addressed corporate
taxpayers and provided:
Bad debts or accounts charged off by a corporation because of the fact that
they were determined to be worthless, and subsequently recovered, consti-
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931), based its
holding on just such an interpretation of § 213(a). See Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. at 363.
48. See, Gunn, supra note 23, at 4-6, n.18-20 (1984) (analyzes the Revenue Act of 1916, ch.
463, §§ 8(g) and 13(d), 39 Stat. 756, 763, 771 (1916)).
Ironically, according to Gunn, the term "accruing" as used in the 1913 Law did not connote the
concept of accrual accounting as we know it today, but was rather a nontechnical term. Under the
1913 Law the only acceptable method of accounting was the cash receipts and disbursements
method. Therefore, Congress had to replace the term "accruing" with the more specific word, "re-
ceived," in 1916 to establish a clear general rule of cash accounting to which accrual accounting
could be a statutorily authorized alternative pursuant to §§ 8(g) and 13(d) of the Revenue Act of
1916. See Gunn, supra note 23, at 4-5, n.18.
49. See supra note 47.
50. By the time the Treasury Department promulgated this regulation, the 1916 Act had been
amended by the Revenue Act of 1917. The Revenue Act of 1917, ch. 63, 40 Stat. 300 (1917), was
not written as a complete entity. Rather, it was an amendment to the Revenue Act of 1916 that
consisted of a huge rate increase to help finance World War I. Under the Revenue Act of 1917 the
top individual rate rose from 15% under the Revenue Act of 1916 (a 2% base rate, plus a 13%
surtax) to 63% under the Revenue Act of 1917. See R. BLAKEY & G. BLAKEY, THE FEDERAL
INCoME TAx 120, 151 (1940). Because the Revenue Act of 1917 was basically a rate increase, the
provisions of the Revenue Act of 1916 that dealt with accounting for taxes on an annual basis were
not changed by the Revenue Act of 1917.
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tute income for the year in which recovered, regardless of the date when the
amounts were charged off. Neither the date at which the debt was charged
off nor the fact that it was or was not deducted from gross income in any
return made for tax purposes, will in any way affect its character as income
of the year in which recovered.5 1
The forerunner of this regulation, promulgated pursuant to the 1913 Law
merely provided, "Bad debts, if so charged off the company's books, dur-
ing the year, are proper deductions. But such debts, if subsequently col-
lected, must be treated as income."52 One could infer from this
regulation under the 1913 Law that the taxpayer should treat subse-
quently collected bad debts as income in the year of collection. However,
the wording of this regulation also permits the interpretation that the
taxpayer could treat the collected amount as income by amending the
return for the year in which the corporation took the bad debt deduction
by offsetting the bad debt deduction with the amount subsequently col-
lected. Such a procedure would accurately correct the tax liability for
the earlier year to the extent that it was based upon an erroneous as-
sumption regarding the worthlessness of the debt in question. Further-
more, amendment of the earlier year, rather than inclusion in the later
year, would preclude an undeserved windfall to either the government or
the taxpayer through a change in applicable tax rates.5 3 Article 110 of
51. Treas. Reg. 33, art. 110 (1918), reprinted in 132 INTERNAL REVENUE ACTS OF THE
UNITED STATES 1909-1950: LEGISLATIvE HISTORIES, LAWS, AND ADMINISTRATIVE DOCUMENTS
(B. Reams, ed., 1979) [hereinafter REVENUE ACTS 1909-1950].
52. Treas. Reg. 33, art. 125 (1914) reprinted in 132 REVENUE ACTS, 1909-1950, supra note 51.
53. Inclusion in the later year rather than amendment of the earlier year can give rise to unde-
served windfalls in the following ways: If a $1,000 bad debt were written off when the taxpayer was
in the 30% tax bracket, but recovered when the taxpayer was in the 70% tax bracket, the inclusion
in the later year would cost the taxpayer $700 in taxes even though the initial deduction saved the
taxpayer only $300 in taxes. The taxpayer ends up worse off to the extent of $400 than if he had
never taken the deduction in the first place, an undeserved windfall to the government. If the rates
were reversed so that the taxpayer was in the 70% bracket when he wrote off the $1,000 bad debt,
but in only the 30% bracket when he recovered that debt, the taxpayer would owe only $300 in tax
in the year of inclusion even though he saved 5700 tax in the earlier year of deduction, thus provid-
ing an undeserved windfall of $400 to the taxpayer. Precluding these windfalls by amending the
earlier year's return would not simply mean that the taxpayer should repay to the government only
the amount of tax saved in the earlier year of deduction. The taxpayer should also pay interest on
the tax saved in the earlier year. The payment of interest would compensate the government for
being deprived of money that it would have had if the taxpayer had not erroneously assumed the
worthlessness of the debt. The requirement that the taxpayer pay interest should not be regarded as
penalizing the taxpayer, but merely as returning to the government the time value of the money that
the taxpayer had already obtained by virtue of its having earlier reported on the basis of an errone-
ous assumption.
It is, of course, possible that if the recovery occurs many years after the deduction was taken, the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss1/6
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Regulation 33, pursuant to the 1916 Act, foreclosed this interpretation
and required inclusion in the year of recovery even if the earlier deduc-
tion had not given rise to a tax benefit.14 Thus, the regulation under the
1916 Act on the collection of bad debts by corporate taxpayers demon-
strated an approach that favored ease of administration through strict
adherence to annual accounting over an accurate reflection of and taxa-
tion of income over time.
This movement toward strict adherence to annual accounting in the
regulations pursuant to the 1916 Act was further evidenced by Article
127 of Regulation 33 regarding corporate taxpayers. Article 127 pro-
vided in part:
Each year's return complete. [ ]Each year's return, both as to income and
deductions therefrom, must be complete within itself. Charges, of whatever
character, against income can not be cumulative. They must be deducted
from the income of the year in which incurred or not at all. The expenses,
liabilities, or deficit of one year can not be used to reduce the income of a
subsequent year.55
Unlike Article 110 of Regulation 33 under the 1916 Act, dealing with the
recovery of bad debts, Article 127 apparently had no antecedent provi-
sion in the regulations under the 1913 Law. However, the absence of an
antecedent provision does not mean that the regulations as a whole were
completely rewritten to emphasize the requirement of annual accounting.
Articles 110 and 127 concerned only corporate taxpayers. The articles
addressing individuals contained no counterpart to Article 127 which re-
quired very strict adherence to annual accounting by corporate taxpay-
ers. Furthermore, Article 4, dealing with an individual taxpayer's
collection of previously charged bad debts simply provided, "Bad debts
which have been claimed and allowed as a deduction in prior returns are
considered income if subsequently collected. '56 This language is almost
identical to that found in the corporate taxpayer regulations promulgated
amount of accrued interest could be quite substantial and, indeed, could exceed the tax owed.
Whether this factor, among others, should limit the taxpayer's ability to reopen earlier years in lieu
of adhering strictly to annual accounting by simply including the debt recovery in the later year will
be addressed later in this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 282-85.
54. Treas. Reg. 33, article 110 required inclusion in income in the later year regardless of the
absence of a tax benefit in the earlier year, stating, "Neither the date at which the debt was charged
off nor the fact that it was or was not deducted from gross income in any return made for tax
purposes, will in any way affect its character as income of the year in which recovered." Treas. Reg.
33, art. 110 (1918), reprinted in 132 REVENUE AcTs 1909-1950, supra note 51.
55. Treas. Reg. 33, art. 127 (1918), reprinted in 132 REVENUE AcTs 1909-1950, supra note 51.
56. Treas. Reg. 33, art. 4 (1918), reprinted in 132 REVENUE AcTs 1909-1950, supra note 51.
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pursuant to the 1913 Law57 which did not take as firm an approach to
annual accounting as did the corporate taxpayer regulations promulgated
pursuant to the 1916 Act. Thus, the language in the regulations under
the 1916 Act was not consistent in its emphasis upon strict adherence to
annual accounting. It is unlikely, however, that the Treasury intended
for annual accounting to be less strictly applied to individual taxpayers
than to corporate taxpayers. Rather, two interrelated factors most likely
precluded the Treasury from drafting regulations that were internally
consistent in their approach to annual accounting.
The first factor was the Treasury's general lack of experience in ad-
ministering an income tax. As mentioned earlier, the 1913 Law was the
first income tax statute passed pursuant to the sixteenth amendment.
However, Congress did not consider the 1913 Law as a separate income
tax act. Instead, it considered the income tax provisions merely as part
of an overall tariff bill.58 Furthermore, the 1913 Law did not raise reve-
nue as effectively as Congress had anticipated,5 9 partly because the ad-
ministration of the law was complicated and difficult for the Treasury to
master.60 The Revenue Act of 1916, on the other hand, was written as a
separate entity instead of as part of another bill.61 The Revenue Act of
1916 did not merely clarify the income tax statute; it completely rewrote
it.62 Thus, the Treasury, faced with a new income tax statute before it
had adjusted to administering an income tax at all, probably drafted reg-
ulations as ad hoe responses to administrative problems rather than as
internally consistent works of art. For example, if a corporate taxpayer
raised an issue on accounting for taxes, the Treasury may have resolved
that problem by amending the appropriate corporate taxpayer regula-
tions to emphasize the need for strict adherence to annual accounting
without ever considering whether the regulations for individual taxpay-
ers should be similarly amended. Although one might question the wis-
dom or propriety of such an ad hoc approach, the second of the
interrelated factors, namely World War I, made it almost impossible for
the Treasury to take the time required to develop an internally consistent
and carefully planned regulatory scheme.
57. See supra text accompanying note 52.
58. See R. BLAKEY & G. BLAKEY, supra note 50, at 74-75, 119-20.
59. See R. BLAKEY & G. BLAKEY, supra note 50, at 104; J. WITTE, THE POLITICS AND DE-
VELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAx 79 (1985).
60. R. BLAKEY & G. BLAKEY, supra note 50, at 100-01.
61. Id. at 119-20.
62. Id. at 120.
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At the same time that administrative problems with the new income
tax partly caused the failure of the Income Tax Law of 1913 to generate
the anticipated revenues,63 the outbreak of World War I in 1914 had a
devastating impact on American trade with Europe. Trade with Ger-
many, France and Britain was suddenly cut off in August of 1914, caus-
ing a serious decline in both general revenues and customs duties." An
economic recovery in 1915 postponed the need to raise taxes for a short
time.65  However, by 1916 a tax increase was needed as America pre-
pared for a potential war.66 Additionally, as American entry into World
War I approached, the government decided that the United States should
finance the war effort mainly through increased taxes and not through
borrowing.67 It also became clear at this time that the income tax would
be the most effective of all taxes at raising revenue quickly.68 As a result,
the Treasury was forced not only to administer a new type of tax that
was being amended or rewritten so often that attempts at administration
were like shots at a moving target,69 but also to administer that tax in a
manner that would generate the revenue needed to support a massive war
effort.70 Thus, in initially administering the income tax, the Treasury
63. See supra note 59.
64. See C. GILBERT, AMERICAN FINANCING OF WORLD WAR I, 23-26 (1970); J. WrrrE, supra
note 59, at 79.
65. See S. RATNER, TAXATION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 343 (1942); J. WRITE, supra
note 59, at 79.
66. See S. RATNER, supra note 65, at 343-46; J. WRITE, supra note 59, at 81-82.
67. See Hamel, The Joint Congressional Committee On Internal Revenue Taxation, 5 NAT'L.
INCOME TAX MAO. 161, 161 (1927) (Note that The National Income Tax Magazine later became the
present day Taxes.) See also, S. RATNER, supra note 65, at 344-52.
68. See J. WrrrE, supra note 59, at 86.
69. In the space of seven years, 1913 through 1919, five Revenue Acts were passed and took
effect; the Income Tax Law of 1913, the Revenue Act of 1916, the Revenue Act of March 3, 1917,
the War Revenue Act of October 3, 1917 and the Revenue Act of 1918. All previous and future
references in this Article to the Revenue Act of 1917 are to the War Revenue Act of October 3, 1917.
The Revenue Act of March 3, 1917, ch. 159, 39 Stat. 1000 (1917) was almost immediately rendered
obsolete by the United States' entry into World War I and was replaced by the War Revenue Act of
October 3, 1917 before it could even be implemented. See R. BLAKEY & G. BLAKEY, supra note 50,
at 122, 129.
70. Obviously, more revenue could be raised if a higher rate were applied to equivalent taxable
amounts. The major effect of the War Revenue Act of 1917 was to raise tax rates substantially. See
supra note 50. Thus, after the War Revenue Act of 1917, it was quite likely that a substantially
higher rate would apply to a recovered bad debt if annual accounting were strictly applied and the
recovered amount were included in income in the later year of recovery than if the earlier year of
deduction were amended and only the taxes saved in the earlier year were paid to the government.
(For an example of the effect of the rate differential, see supra note 53.) Thus, in some instances,
strict adherence to annual accounting during World War I enabled the Treasury not only to simplify
administration of the tax system, but also to generate greater revenue.
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understandably might have drafted regulations as ad hoe responses to
problems and might have favored ease of administration through strict
adherence to annual accounting over a more equitable system that accu-
rately reflected and taxed income over time.
At the same time, however, the Treasury was not oblivious to the ineq-
uities that could result from strict adherence to annual accounting. Nor
did it completely ignore the goal of accurately computing and taxing in-
come over time. Even during the early years of its experience with an
income tax, the Treasury promulgated regulations that promoted equita-
ble treatment of the taxpayer at the expense of strict adherence to annual
accounting.71 Regulations requiring strict adherence to annual account-
ing72 co-existed with regulations that not only sought an accurate reflec-
tion and taxation of income over time, but also furthered that equitable
goal by not adhering strictly to the concept of annual accounting. Thus,
even in the very early years of our income tax system the Treasury appar-
ently was not zealously wedded to basing our income tax system on an-
nual accounting. Instead, the Treasury was apparently doing its best to
administer the income tax fairly and equitably. But the press of revenue
needs and its own lack of experience in administering an income tax at
times caused the Treasury to opt for administrative convenience at the
expense of equity.73 The conflicting goals of developing a new tax system
in an equitable manner and of using that tax system to raise revenue
quickly for a war effort apparently resulted in a trial and error approach
to income tax administration in general74 and to accounting for income
taxes in particular.75 A more detailed examination of this trial and error
approach can illuminate the role that the Treasury and Congress really
intended for annual accounting to play.
71. See infra notes 90, 106-08 and accompanying text.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 51 and 55.
73. See J. WrrrE, supra note 59, at 83. The author states:
The general approach of financing the war through heavy taxation was supported by most
of the academic community, which sent a letter to Congress outlining the advantages of
this course. Curiously, the question of equity or justice was addressed only in terms of the
inappropriateness of laying the burden of war debts on returning servicemen and suc-
ceeding generations. Although the proposed changes in the income tax would clearly in-
crease progressivity, changes were not accompanied by calls for income redistribution.
The need for revenue ruled the discussion.
74. See Hamel, supra note 67, at 161; Kornhauser, The Origins Of Capital Gains Taxation:
What's Law Got To Do With It?, 39 Sw. L.J. 869, 872-73 (1985).
75. See Helvering v. Cannon Valley Milling Co., 129 F.2d 642, 646 n.3 (8th Cir. 1942).
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B. Equitable Deviations from Annual Accounting Whose Origins
Antedate the Revenue Act of 1918
In examining strict adherence to annual accounting prior to the Reve-
nue Act of 1918, this Article noted that the Revenue Act of 1916 intro-
duced the concept of accrual basis accounting through sections 8(g) and
13(d) of that Act.76 The language of both of those sections, however,
authorized more than merely the accrual method of accounting. Section
8(g) provided:
An individual keeping accounts upon any basis other than that of actual
receipts and disbursements, unless such other basis does not clearly reflect
his income, may, subject to regulations made by the Commissioner of Inter-
nal Revenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, make his
return upon the basis upon which his accounts are kept, in which case the
tax shall be computed upon his income as so returned."
Similarly, with respect to corporate taxpayers, section 13(d) provided:
A corporation, joint-stock company or association, or insurance company,
keeping accounts upon any basis other than that of actual receipts and dis-
bursements, unless such other basis does not clearly reflect its income, may,
subject to regulations made by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, with
the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, make its return upon the
basis upon which its accounts are kept, in which case the tax shall be com-
puted upon its income as so returned.78
Thus, sections 8(g) and 13(d) actually authorized the Commissioner to
permit a taxpayer to report his income at annual intervals in accordance
with the manner in which he kept his books and records, unless the man-
ner in which the books and records were kept did not clearly reflect the
taxpayer's income. If a taxpayer kept his books and records (and calcu-
lated his income) in a transactional manner, Congress apparently author-
ized the Commissioner to let the taxpayer report his income in this
manner, so long as this manner clearly reflected his income.7 9
Congress carried sections 8(g) and 13(d) of the 1916 Act into the Rev-
enue Act of 1918 via section 212(b), which provided in pertinent part:
The net income shall be computed upon the basis of the taxpayer's annual
accounting period (fiscal year or calendar year, as the case may be) in ac-
76. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
77. Revenue Act of 1916, ch. 463, 39 Stat. 756, 763 (1916).
78. Id. at 771.
79. Indeed, in regulations promulgated pursuant to the Revenue Act of 1916, the Treasury did
authorize the reporting of income on a transactional basis. See infra notes 90-92 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the completed contract method of accounting.
Washington University Open Scholarship
188 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
cordance with the method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the
books of such taxpayer; but if no such method of accounting has been so
employed, or if the method employed does not clearly reflect the income,
the computation shall be made upon such basis and in such manner as in
the opinion of the Commissioner does clearly reflect the income. If the
taxpayer's annual accounting period is other than a fiscal year as defined in
section 200 or if the taxpayer has no annual accounting period or does not
keep books, the net income shall be computed on the basis of the calendar
year.80
Section 212(b) had to be read in conjunction with section 213(a) which
stated in pertinent part: "The amount of all such items [which could
conceivably encompass gross income] shall be included in the gross in-
come for the taxable year in which received by the taxpayer, unless,
under methods of accounting permitted under subdivision (b) of section
212, any such amounts are to be properly accounted for as of a different
period."8" Thus, one could interpret section 212(b), like sections 8(g)
and 13(d) of the 1916 Act, as authorizing innumerable methods of ac-
counting other than the cash receipts and disbursements method.
However, in 1931 in Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co. 2, the Supreme
Court indicated that section 212(b) of the 1918 Act authorized only ac-
crual accounting in a manner that adhered strictly to annual account-
ing. 3 Furthermore, the Sanford & Brooks Court indicated that section
212(b) was not the statutory underpinning for certain Treasury Regula-
tions that authorized the transactional completed contract method of ac-
counting" when it stated:
Under the statutes and regulations in force in 1920, two methods were pro-
vided by which, to a limited extent, the expenses of a transaction incurred
in one year might be offset by the amounts actually received from it in
80. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 212(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1064-65 (1919).
81. Id. at 1065.
82. 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
83. Id. at 363. The Court stated:
All the revenue acts which have been enacted since the adoption of the Sixteenth
Amendment have uniformly assessed the tax on the basis of annual returns showing the net
result of all the taxpayer's transactions during a fixed accounting period, either the calen-
dar year, or, at the option of the taxpayer, the particular fiscal year which he may adopt.
The amount of all such items is required to be included in the gross income for the taxable
year in which received by the taxpayer, unless they may be properly accounted for on the
accrual basis under § 212(b).
Id.
84. For a description and analysis of the completed contract method of accounting, see infra
notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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another. One was by returns on the accrual basis under § 212(b)... The
other was under Treasury Regulations (Art. 121 of Reg. 33 of Jan. 2, 1918,
under the Revenue Acts of 1916 and 1917; Art. 36 of Reg. 45, Apr. 19,
1919, under the Revenue Act of 1918) providing that in reporting the in-
come derived from certain long term contracts, the taxpayer might either
report all of the receipts and all of the expenditures made on account of a
particular contract in the year in which the work was completed....85
The Court thus described the completed contract method of accounting
separately from section 212(b), and thereby indicated that authorization
for the completed contract method of accounting must come from some
other statutory provision. The Court, however, did not indicate what
other provision provided such authorization. Indeed, if section 212(b)
could not be read broadly enough to authorize the completed contract
method of accounting, the Revenue Act of 1918 did not authorize that
transactional method of accounting at all.
The Sanford & Brooks opinion, therefore, provided a curious situation
in which the Court placed its imprimatur on the transactional completed
contract method of accounting but at the same time interpreted the only
statute which could authorize such method of accounting as authorizing
only accrual accounting in a manner that strictly adhered to annual ac-
counting. The Sanford & Brooks Court, by limiting the scope of section
212(b) of the 1918 Act, gave the impression that only methods of ac-
counting that fit within the concept of annual accounting were statutorily
authorized. Similarly, methods of accounting that did not comport with
annual accounting were unauthorized. The Court's approving reference
to the long term contract accounting regulations was thus an anomaly.
After Sanford & Brooks, two lower courts soon wrestled with the
anomalous position in which the Supreme Court had placed the com-
pleted contract method of accounting. These courts upheld the com-
pleted contract method most likely because, as discussed below, even
prior to the Sanford & Brooks case Congress clearly indicated that it
intended a broad interpretation of section 212(b), rather than the narrow
interpretation with its attendant emphasis upon adherence to annual ac-
counting that the Court accorded it in Sanford & Brooks. We now turn
to an in-depth examination of the long term contract accounting regula-
tions and how the completed contract method survived the anomalous
position in which the Supreme Court had placed those regulations.
85. 282 U.S. at 366.
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1. Accounting for Long Term Contracts
As already noted, under strict adherence to annual accounting a tax-
payer could engage in a transaction that did not generate an overall profit
and yet could be subject to taxation if receipts from the transaction ex-
ceeded deductible expenditures in any one year. This would result even
if deductible expenditures from the transaction produced no tax benefit
in previous years. Indeed, this is exactly what transpired in the Sanford
& Brooks case.86 However, despite overbroad language in the Court's
opinion indicating the lack of any general scheme for taxing income
other than in accordance with annual accounting, 7 and despite the ab-
sence of an applicable loss carryover provision," the taxpayer in Sanford
& Brooks suffered from the harsh application of strict adherence to an-
nual accounting for another reason. The taxpayer failed to avail itself of
ameliorative provisions in the Treasury Regulations89 that applied trans-
actional instead of annual accounting principles to situations just like the
one faced by the Sanford & Brooks taxpayer.
These ameliorative provisions first appeared in the regulations promul-
gated pursuant to the Revenue Act of 1916, as amended by the Revenue
Act of 1917.90 Ironically, this was the same set of regulations that re-
86. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
87. Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359, 365 (1931). For an analysis of why the
Court's language was overbroad, seeGrauer, supra note 3, at 343-45.
88. See supra note 28.
89. See Sanford & Brooks, 282 U.S. at 366. The Court stated:
Under the statutes and regulations in force in 1920, two methods were provided by
which, to a limited extent, the expenses of a transaction incurred in one year might be
offset by the amounts actually received from it in another....
But the court [of appeals] did not hold, nor does respondent assert, that it ever filed
returns in compliance...'with these regulations .... or otherwise attempted to avail itself
of their provisions ....
90. The applicable regulations provided in pertinent part:
Contracting corporations. - Corporations engaged in contracting operations and which
have numerous uncompleted contracts, which in some cases run for periods of several
years, will be allowed to prepare their returns so that the gross income will be arrived at on
the basis of completed work-that is, on jobs which have been finally completed-any and
all moneys received in payment for completed jobs will be returned as income for the year
in which the work was completed. If the gross income is arrived at by this method, the
deduction from gross income should be limited to the expenditures made on account of
such completed contracts.
Income on basis of estimates. - Or the percentage of profit from the contract may be
estimated on the basis of percentage of completion and payments made thereon, in which
case the income to be returned each year during the performance of the contract will be
computed upon the basis of the expenses incurred on such contract during the year; that is
to say, if one-half of the estimated expenses necessary to the full performance of the con-
tract are incurred during one year, one-half of the gross contract price should be returned
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss1/6
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quired strict adherence to annual accounting in the bad debt recovery
area.
The first part of this regulation, "Contracting corporations," was a for-
malization and elaboration of a position taken by the Treasury in 1915.91
This part, generally called the "completed contract method of account-
ing," evidences a purely transactional approach to accounting, and vio-
lates every tenet of annual accounting. Under the completed contract
method, the taxpayer reports no income or loss until a multi-year trans-
action is completed. If the taxpayer in Sanford & Brooks had availed
itself of the completed contract method, it would have attained the result
it desired and reported no gain for the year 1920 (aside from interest
income that was added to a judgment it recovered). Indeed, the court of
appeals in the Sanford & Brooks case held for the taxpayer in part be-
cause "[t]he case of the petitioner here falls within the spirit, if not within
the letter, of this regulation."92
The second part of this regulation, "Income on the basis of estimates,"
is generally called the "percentage of completion method of accounting."
This method evidences neither a purely annual nor purely transactional
approach to accounting. Rather, it attempts to ameliorate the inequities
that can result from both strict adherence to annual accounting and from
transactional accounting under the completed contract method. The
percentage of completion method of accounting first looks to see if a
transaction is expected to generate a profit. Then it allocates to each year
a percentage of the expected profit that is equivalent to the percentage of
the anticipated overall expenses that were incurred in that year. In so
doing, the percentage of completion method precludes the loss of tax
benefits that could result under a strict approach to annual accounting
whenever deductible expenses in one accounting period exceed receipts.
At the same time, the percentage of completion method alleviates the
harshness that could result from the bunching of income in one year
under the completed contract method's purely transactional approach. 93
as income for that year; all under or over statements of income to be adjusted upon com-
pletion of the contract and return made accordingly.
Treas. Reg. 33, art.121 (1918), reprinted in 132 REVENUE ACTS 1909-1950, supra note 51.
91. See T.D. 2161, 17 TREAS. DEC. INT. REV. 109, 111 (1915).
92. Sanford & Brooks Co. v. Commissioner, 35 F.2d 312, 314 (4th Cir. 1929), rev'd sub nom.
Burnet v. Sanford & Brooks Co., 282 U.S. 359 (1931).
93. Bunching is an inequity that usually results from the confluence of the realization require-
ment with a progressive rate system. Under the realization requirement, income that may accrue
over many years is not recognized until a realization event, such as a sale, occurs. For example, if
stock is purchased in year one for $10.00 per share, appreciates to $20.00 per share at the end of year
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The percentage of completion method could thus be described as a
hybrid of both annual and transactional accounting. Its existence dem-
onstrates the Treasury's greater concern for equitable results than for
adherence to any one system of accounting. However, because this Arti-
cle is concerned with whether the courts should have emphasized adher-
ence to annual accounting to the extent that they did, and because the
completed contract method represents the antithesis of annual account-
ing, our focus now shifts to the completed contract method and how it
survived the Supreme Court's overly emphatic adherence to annual
accounting.
In Bent v. Commissioner94 the dispute revolved around whether the
taxpayer was keeping the books and records of his partnership on an
accrual or a completed contract basis. The taxpayer contended that his
partnership was using the accrual method. The Commissioner main-
tained that the partnership was using the completed contract method,
and that the completed contract method clearly reflected income; there-
fore the tax liability should be calculated in accordance with the com-
pleted contract method of accounting. The validity of the completed
contract method was not attacked. However, in lengthy and somewhat
murky dicta, the court raised several interesting points.
First, the court noted that on several occasions Congress had reen-
acted section 212(b) of the Revenue Act of 1918 (the successor provision
to sections 8(g) and 13(d) of the 1916 Act which initially authorized the
completed contract method) without change after the Treasury had
promulgated the completed contract method regulation applicable to the
tax year in question. The Bent court then stated, "The re-enactment of
the statute in exactly the same terms where the statute has been inter-
one, is not sold and appreciates to $30.00 per share at the end of year two, and is finally sold in year
three when it is worth $40.00 per share, $30.00 of gain is recognized in year three, even though this
gain accrued at a steady pace over three separate accounting periods. If the progressive rate struc-
ture taxes each $10.00 per share of gain at a higher rate than the previous $10.00 per share of gain,
bunching all the gain into the year of realization will result in a higher tax than if the gain had been
taxed each year as it accrued. Similarly, under the purely transactional completed contract method,
all of the profit from a transaction is bunched into the year that the transaction is completed even
though the profit may have been earned or accrued in a steady stream over an extended number of
years. Application of a progressive rate system to a completed contract approach could result in a
higher tax than if a portion of the profit were reported in each year that it was earned or accrued.
The percentage of completion approach tries to preclude the imposition of this higher tax that would
result from bunching under the completed contract method by spreading out the profit on the trans-
action over a number of years.
94. 56 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1932).
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preted by the regulations of the Treasury Department is 'persuasive evi-
dence of legislative approval of the regulation.' "9g Although courts
often use this line of reasoning to uphold Treasury regulations, this rea-
soning should not be used absent evidence that in reenacting the relevant
statute Congress specifically considered the validity of the regulation in
question.96 In the instant case, however, this reasoning is even more
questionable. Only one year prior to the decision in the Bent case, the
Supreme Court in Sanford & Brooks had intimated that section 212(b)
authorized only accrual accounting, thus implying that statutory author-
ization for the completed contract method must lie elsewhere.97 It is
therefore perplexing that the Bent court should uphold the completed
contract method through the reenactment of section 212(b). The most
plausible explanation may be that the Bent court realized that the San-
ford & Brooks Court was wrong about the narrow scope of section
212(b), but was not willing to come right out and state that the emperor
had no clothes.
Instead, in its second point, the Bent court committed heresy. It basi-
cally indicated that in some cases, transactional accounting more clearly
reflects income than does annual accounting.9" How impudent of this
appeals court! The Supreme Court in Sanford & Brooks had just stated
that even though a transaction extending over several years may result in
a loss, there was absolutely no precedent for relieving a taxpayer from
paying tax on net income received in any one of those years. 99 But the
Bent court was quite clever. It included the Sanford & Brooks language
95. Id. at 102.
96. See infra notes 242-49 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
98. The Court stated:
[T]he contract is a unit, and, until the contract is completed and accepted, it cannot be
definitely known what the profit may be or what loss may be suffered by the contractor.
The books are full of instances where, by reason of defective work or unsuspected obstacles
or changes in prices of labor and materials, contractors have suffered losses, notwithstand-
ing the unit price basis and in the case of the contract based upon cost plus a fixed fee the
work may be prolonged over a long period of time by reason of difficulties in the work, or
the fee might be diminished or wholly lost because of inability to complete the contract.
These observations, familiar to all, are made merely for the purpose of indicating that under
such contracts the income, that is, the profi derived from a contract is not necessarily re-
flected by the payments made thereunder for a particular period ...
56 F.2d at 102-03 (emphasis added).
99. The Sanford & Brooks Court stated:
A taxpayer may be in receipt of net income in one year and not in another. The net result
of the two years, if combined in a single taxable period, might still be a loss; but it has never
been supposed that fact would relieve him from a tax on the first, or that it affords any
reason for postponing the assessment of the tax until the end of a lifetime, or for some
Washington University Open Scholarship
194 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
in its opinion, albeit buried in a much longer quotation from Sanford &
Brooks that fills almost two full columns in the Federal Reporterl t'° In-
terestingly enough, the Bent court chose to end its lengthy quotation
from Sanford & Brooks just at the point where the Sanford & Brooks
Court simultaneously placed its imprimatur on the completed contract
method of accounting and indicated that section 212(b) did not authorize
promulgation of the completed contract method of accounting. 101 Thus,
the Bent court's third point was that the Supreme Court had placed its
seal of approval (albeit in dicta) on the completed contract method.
The Bent court accomplished a neat trick. It cited a Supreme Court
case as authority for upholding a regulation, but gave a theoretical justifi-
cation for the regulation that was contrary to everything for which that
same Supreme Court case stood. That the Bent court accomplished this
with the Sanford & Brooks opinion is just one indication of how flawed
the Sanford & Brooks opinion is.1" 2
The more interesting question in all of this is why the Bent court en-
gaged in this dicta when the parties had not even challenged the validity
of the completed contract method. Perhaps the Bent court was con-
cerned that after Sanford & Brooks so strongly rejected transactional ac-
counting, the validity of the completed contract method would be
challenged as violative of annual accounting, and Sanford & Brooks' ap-
proving references to the completed contract method could be ignored as
dicta. Such concern would not have been unfounded. A direct challenge
to the completed contract method as violative of annual accounting was
then in the Second Circuit.' Authority for upholding the completed
contract method approach might therefore prove helpful to other courts
of appeals inclined to uphold this non-annual accounting method."m
In fact, the Bent opinion was helpful. The Second Circuit in Badgley v.
Commissioner"0 5 cited Bent and disposed of the challenge to the validity
other indefinite period, to ascertain more precisely whether the final outcome of the period,
or of a given transaction, will be a gain or a loss.
282 U.S. at 364-65.
100. See 56 F.2d at 103-04.
101. See supra text accompanying note 85.
102. For additional evidence of flaws in the Court's reasoning in Sanford & Brooks, see Grauer,
supra note 3, at 343-49.
103. See Badgley v. Commissioner, 59 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1932).
104. See Comment, Abolition of The Completed Contract Method Under Fire: A Study in Legis-
lative Compromise, 32 AM. U.L. REv. 1009, 1012-13 (1983) (completed contract method "is an
exception, however, to the annual accounting concept for reporting income .....
105. 59 F.2d 203 (2d Cir. 1932).
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of the completed contract method in a one paragraph per curiam opin-
ion. The existence of Bent precluded the Second Circuit from having to
reconcile the completed contract method with the Supreme Court's view
of transactional accounting in Sanford & Brooks-a reconciliation that
could not have withstood close scrutiny.
Finally, one must logically ask, "Why would two circuit courts strive
so hard to uphold a transactional method of accounting after the
Supreme Court had indicated that our tax statutes required strict adher-
ence to annual accounting?" Certainly, skepticism of the reasoning in
Sanford & Brooks, standing alone, could not be enough. The following
examination of the history of the installment sales provisions offers an-
other explanation. Courts had previously struck down installment sales
regulations, which did not strictly comport with annual accounting, as
not statutorily authorized and were rebuked by Congress in a manner
that may have made future courts wary of provoking similar rebukes.
2. The Saga of the Installment Sale Provisions
When property is sold on the installment method, the seller typically
takes a small portion of the contract price in the form of cash at the time
of sale and accepts an interest bearing promissory note from the buyer
for the balance of the purchase price. To secure the buyer's obligation,
the seller usually retains a lien on the property sold. If the seller is an
accrual method taxpayer, adherence to annual accounting would require
that the taxpayer include in income in the year of sale the total profit
under the sales contract, not just the cash received. The total profit is
includable, because under the contract of sale, the seller's right to receive
the full sales price accrued when the seller delivered or transferred the
property. If the seller is a cash receipts and disbursements method tax-
payer, adherence to annual accounting would also require, in most cases,
that the seller include almost the total profit under the sales contract in
income in the year of sale. Assuming that the buyer is creditworthy, the
note received is property having a value equal almost to its face value
(i.e., the difference between the cash received as a down payment and the
total contract price). Therefore, having received cash and property of
value totaling nearly the entire sales price, the cash basis taxpayer would
include almost his entire profit from the sale in income in the year of sale.
Such a result, however, may not be equitable to the seller because he
may not receive enough cash in the year of sale to cover his taxes. For
example, if property with a basis of $100 were sold for $1,100 with the
1989]
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seller receiving $100 cash plus a note for $1,000 payable in installments
of $100 per year for ten years plus appropriate interest, the seller would
owe tax of $280 in the first year, if he were in the 28% tax bracket, even
though he had received only $100 in cash. Generally speaking, the in-
stallment sale method of accounting deviates from this annual account-
ing result by requiring the selling taxpayer to include in income each year
only that percentage of the principal cash received that is the same as the
percentage of the profit on the transaction to total sales price. In our
example, the $1,000 profit is 90.91% of the total sales price of $1,100.
Therefore, under the installment method of accounting, the seller would
include in income only"$90.91 plus interest during the year of sale and in
each succeeding year thereafter as the $100 principal payments on the
note flowed in. Equity thus tempers annual accounting by assuring that
the seller does not owe more tax each year than cash received in that
year. In our example, assuming a 28% tax bracket, the seller would owe
only $25.45 of tax in the year of sale and in each succeeding year on each
$100 principal payment.
The Treasury first introduced the installment sale method of account-
ing in the regulations promulgated pursuant to the Revenue Act of 1916,
as amended by the Revenue Act of 1917.106 These regulations limited
the application of this method of accounting, however, to sales in which
the seller retained title to the property until the property was fully paid
for. 107 One year later, in regulations promulgated pursuant to the Reve-
nue Act of 1918, the Treasury eliminated the distinction between sales in
which the seller retained title until the full contract price was paid and
cases in which title passed at the time of sale. 10
Through the Revenue Act of 1918, the only specific authorization for
installment reporting was in the Treasury Regulations. Authority for
these regulatory provisions could flow from sections 8(g) and 13(d) of the
1916 Act, and from section 212(b) of the 1918 Act, if it were not con-
strued too narrowly. In 1921, however, Congress got into the act.
The Revenue Act of 1921109 contained a new section, 202(f), which
provided simply: "Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent
106. Treas. Reg. 33, arts. 116, 117 (1918), reprinted in 132 REVENUE AcTs 1909-1950, supra
note 51.
107. Id.
108. See Treas. Reg. 45, arts. 42, 44, 45 (1919), reprinted in 134 REVENUE ACTS 1909-1950,
supra note 51.
109. Ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227 (1921).
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(in the case of property sold under contract providing for payment in
installments) the taxation of that portion of any installment payment rep-
resenting gain or profit in the year in which such payment is received." 110
Ironically, however, section 202, even in the absence of subsection (f),
could have been read as prohibiting installment accounting only with
great difficulty. Section 202 did not address accounting for income at all.
Rather, it dealt with the determination and adjustment of basis and con-
tained various nonrecognition provisions. The legislative histories do not
explain why section 202(f) was added, or why an installment reporting
provision was placed in a section that did not deal with accounting, but
with basis determinations and nonrecognition transactions. Perhaps for
these reasons, a commentator has described section 202(f) of the Reve-
nue Act of 1921 as vague."1 Regardless of whether the section was
vague, misplaced, or ambiguous, however, Congress had indicated that
installment accounting was acceptable.
The validity of the installment accounting regulations came before the
Board of Tax Appeals, the predecessor to the Tax Court, in 1925 in three
cases. 112 The most extensively reasoned of these was Appeal of B.B.
Todd, Inc. "3 which involved tax years prior to the enactment of section
202(f) and which evaluated the installment regulations promulgated pur-
suant to section 212(b) of the Revenue Act of 1918. In a decision that
could be deemed a harbinger of the Supreme Court's rigid approach to
accounting in Sanford & Brooks, the Board held the installment account-
ing regulations invalid. Apparently, the Board's primary reason for in-
validating the installment regulations was a belief that the method did
not clearly reflect income.' 14 This belief arose from a concern that sym-
110. Id. at 231.
111. Emory, The Installment Method of Reporting Income: Its Election, Use and Effect, 53 COR-
NELL L. REv. 181, 186-87 (1968).
112. The three cases were Appeal of Six Hundred And Fifty West End Ave. Co., 2 B.T.A. 958
(1925); Appeal of B.B. Todd, Inc., 1 B.T.A. 762 (1925); and Appeal of Manomet Cranberry Com-
pany, 1 B.T.A. 706 (1925).
113. 1 B.T.A. 762 (1925).
114. See 1 B.T.A. at 766. The Board stated:
If this taxpayer were reporting upon a cash receipts and disbursements basis, it would
report the total cash received, including the cash received from leases entered into prior to
1918. From this cash received it would deduct the cash expended and would arrive at a net
income, correct except to the extent that its business expanded, and, therefore, its accounts
receivable and inventory were greater at the close of the year than at the beginning. To
report, however, upon a basis which considers only the profit upon the business entered
into during a year which is actually reduced to possession in cash, and to exclude all busi-
ness or prior years reduced to possession in cash, at the same time deducting as expenses all
accrued obligations, is to destroy all relationship between the true net income and the
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metry would be skewed by allowing a taxpayer to report "only the profits
realized in cash during the year, while at the same time deducting upon
an accrual basis all the costs of goods upon which such profits were real-
ized, and... further deduct[ing] accrued expenses of the taxable period
for which the reported income is made." 1 5 However, what made Todd a
harbinger of Sanford & Brooks was the Board's conclusion that only two
methods of accounting were authorized by the Revenue Act of 1918:
cash and accrual. Although the Board found that there might be minor
departures from the cash and accrual methods to fit the exigencies of
individual cases, the Board stated that there was "no reason for the injec-
tion of a system of computing income foreign alike to the cash receipts
and disbursements and to' the accrual basis." '116 In effect the Board held
that the installment method of accounting was unacceptable because it
did not comport with the principles of annual accounting.
Congress reacted swiftly. In the Revenue Act of 1926,117 Congress
added section 212(d) which provided:
Under regulations prescribed by the Commissioner with the approval of the
Secretary, a person who regularly sells or otherwise disposes of personal
property on the installment plan may return as income therefrom in any
taxable year that proportion of the installment payments actually received
in that year which the total profit realized or to be realized when the pay-
ment is completed, bears to the total contract price. In the case (1) of a
casual sale or other casual disposition of personal property for a price ex-
ceeding $1,000, or (2) of a sale or other disposition of real property, if in
either case the initial payments do not exceed one-fourth of the purchase
price, the income may, under regulations prescribed by the Commissioner
with the approval of the Secretary, be returned on the basis and in the man-
ner above prescribed in this subdivision. As used in this subdivision the
term "initial payments" means the payments received in cash or property
other than evidences of indebtedness of the purchaser during the taxable
period in which the sale or other disposition is made.118
The Senate Finance Committee Report which accompanied the Act
clearly stated that section 202(f) of the 1921 Act impliedly recognized
income reported for taxation. This is the effect of the installment basis for the earlier years
of its adoption, either by reason of the fact that the taxpayer is newly organized and there-
fore has no prior business experience or by reason of a change of basis from the accrual
method.
Id.
115. Id. at 764.
116. Id. at 767.
117. Ch. 27, 44 Stat. 9 (1926).
118. Id. at 23.
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the validity of the installment method of accounting and that the purpose
of section 212(d) of the 1926 Act was to override the result in the three
1925 Board of Tax Appeals cases. 1 9 Section 1208 of the 1926 Act then
retroactively applied section 212(d) to the computation of all taxes for
prior years beginning with those governed by the Revenue Act of
1916,121 the Act which contained the predecessor sections to section
212(b) of the Revenue Act of 1918.121 Congress thus repudiated the
Todd case's narrow interpretation of section 212(b) of the Revenue Act
of 1918 that only cash and accrual accounting were statutorily
authorized.
Congress' repudiation of the holding in Todd may have resulted from
more than just the existence of section 202(f) of the 1921 Act, referred to
in the Senate Finance Committee Report. 122 After the Todd decision
and while the 1926 Act was pending before Congress, a similar case, Ap-
peal of Blum's Inc., 23 came before the Board of Tax Appeals. Accord-
ing to an article published at that time, "Dr. T.S. Adams, Professor of
Economics at Yale University, and for many years one of the advisers to
the Secretary of the Treasury in matters of revenue legislation, appeared
and testified [at the hearing in Blum's case] in support of the Treasury
119. See SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, INTERNAL REVENUE BILL OF 1926, S. REP. NO. 52,
69th Cong., Ist Sess. 19 (1926) (to accompany H.R.1), reprinted in 97 REVENUE ACTS 1909-1950,
supra note 51. The committee stated:
INSTALLMENT SALES
Section 212(d): The revenue act of 1924 and prior acts have specifically provided two bases
only for reporting income-first, cash receipts and disbursements, and, second, accrual.
Since the enactment of the revenue act of 1921, however, section 202(f) and its successors
have impliedly recognized the existence of a third basis, the installment basis, without in
any wise defining the situations and businesses to which such basis might be applied. The
Commissioner of Internal Revenue has in his regulations provided, in pursuance of his
authority to require a method of computation that will clearly reflect income, the install-
ment basis for reporting income in certain cases....
However, recent decisions of the Board of Tax Appeals (see appeal of 650 West End
Ave. Co., appeal of Manomet Cranberry Co., and appeal of B.B. Todd (Inc.)-all decided
during the past year) have held that similar regulations under earlier acts were invalid and
that the commissioner under the law could authorize no basis other than the cash receipts
and disbursements basis or the accrual basis, except for certain minor departures. The
committee amendment, in order to meet the situation resulting from the decisions, places
the principles of the commissioner's regulations in the law and thereby validates the regula-
tions for all periods after January 1, 1925.
120. 44 Stat. at 130.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 76-82.
122. See supra note 119.
123. 7 B.T.A. 737 (1927).
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Department regulations." '124 The article described Dr. Adams'
testimony:
Dr. T.S. Adams, who represented the Secretary of the Treasury before Con-
gress in the discussions of the Revenue Acts of 1917, 1918, and 1921, testi-
fied that a question was raised at the time the Senate had under
consideration the Revenue Bill of 1918, as to the advisability of incorporat-
ing therein a provision specifically taxing the income from sales of real and
personal property on the installment plan over the period of years in which
the income is realized. The question was considered by Treasury officials
and it was decided that the Department had ample authority under the
provisions of Sections 212 and 213 to take care of the matter by regulation.
The Senate Finance Committee relied upon the assurance of the Treasury
Department that the matter would be taken care of by regulation; other-
wise, as Dr. Adams says, the Senate would have inserted a specific provi-
sion on the subject in the Bill. Dr. Adams testified that nothing was further
removed from the minds of those who worked on the draft of Sections 212
and 213 of the 1918 Act than the thought that just two systems of accounting
would be recognized.125
The publication of this testimony could have had a two-fold effect. First,
it could have influenced Congress as the Revenue Act of 1926 was wind-
ing its way through the legislative process. Second, combined with the
passage and legislative history of section 212(d), Dr. Adams' testimony
could have induced the Ninth Circuit in Bent to affirm the validity of the
completed contract method of accounting as authorized by section
212(b) of the 1918 Revenue Act, despite Sanford & Brooks' intimations
to the contrary. What it unfortunately did not do was prevent the
Supreme Court in Sanford & Brooks from making statements about tax
accounting that flew in the face of the available evidence at the time.
Before considering what actually might have influenced the Sanford &
Brooks court, however, this Article continues to examine the develop-
ment of the statutory and regulatory framework.
124. Doyle, Taxation of Income Derived from Installment Sales, 4 NAT'L INCOME TAX MAG.
(Taxes) 53, 55 (1926).
125. Id. at 56 (emphasis added).
Indeed, support for Dr. Adams' position is found in the first set of regulations promulgated pursu-
ant to section 212 of the Revenue Act of 1918. Article 24 of those regulations stated:
It is recognized that no uniform method of accounting can be prescribed for all taxpayers,
and the law contemplates that each taxpayer shall adopt such forms and systems of ac-
counting as are in his judgment best suited to his purpose. Each taxpayer is requried by
law to make a return of his true income. He must, therefore, maintain such accounting
records as will enable him to do so.
Treas. Reg. 45, art. 24 (1919), reprinted in 134 REVENUE AcTS 1909-1950, supra note 51.
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C. Mixed Signals from a Mixed Act-The Revenue Act of 1918
Initial consideration of a new revenue act in 1918 resulted from grow-
ing and unanticipated deficits caused by World War 1.126 Thus, the ini-
tial bill, as passed by the House, contained substantial rate increases.' 27
However, because 1918 was a Congressional election year, Congress was
not anxious to raise taxes prior to the election. As a result, the legislative
process moved slowly enough for Congress to defer final passage of a tax
act until after the November elections.128 By the time Congress returned
from its election recess, however, World War I had ended and revenue
needs had to be recalculated.12 9 Because Congress anticipated that reve-
nue needs would remain high for some time after the War,1 31 a revised
bill from the Senate Finance Committee called for a tax increase in 1918,
followed by tax decreases in 1919 and 1920.'13
The tax decreases planned for 1919 and 1920 were not the only evi-
dence that the new Act would reflect a transition to a peacetime econ-
omy. Even before the War had ended, equitable provisions had worked
their way into the Act to protect taxpayers from harsh results caused by
the War.132 During the House consideration of the Ways and Means
Committee Bill on September 10, 1918, Representative Hull of Tennessee
stated that although equitable provisions do cause complexity,13 3 the
Committee's "intention and controlling effort" had been "to apportion
taxes equitably," because "equity and simplicity should be the prime req-
uisites of any tax law." 134 On the other hand, the Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue, primarily interested in administrative feasibility of the
tax system as the War ended,1 35 expressed dismay over the insertion of
126. See R. BLAKEY & G. BLAKEY, supra note 50, at 156.
127. See id. at 167.
128. See generally id. at 156-76.
129. Id. at 176.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 178.
132. Id. at 186-87.
133. 56 CONG. REc. 10165 (1918).
134. Id. at 10164-65.
135. While, prior to World War I, the Treasury had demonstrated concern for equity, see supra
text accompanying notes 71-75 and Section B of Part II, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
understandably did not want to deal with new equitable provisions, with their attendant administra-
tive complexity, as soon as the War ended. Prior to America's entry into World War I, when the
income tax system was new, Congress rewrote the tax laws so often and the revenue demands were
so great that administration of the tax system was quite difficult. See supra notes 61-73 and accom-
panying text. When World War I ended, America may have returned to "normalcy," but the Treas-
ury did not. It was not until 1927 that the following statement could be made: "For the first time
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equitable provisions into the tax laws. 136 Thus, tension existed between
the desire for equity and the desire for administrative simplicity.
Inasmuch as the Revenue Act of 1918 began its legislative journey
before the end of World War I, and was initially envisioned as a revenue
raising measure, 137 it is not surprising that some provisions would be
worded to emphasize the need for administrative simplicity. Such provi-
sions include the annual accounting sections.138 However, these annual
accounting provisions should not be read in a vacuum. Other equitable
provisions that undercut any claim to total preeminence by annual ac-
counting existed in the statute. Yet in Sanford & Brooks the Supreme
Court granted annual accounting a preeminent position by doing just
that-reading the annual accounting provisions of the Revenue Act of
1918 in a vacuum. Therefore, those annual accounting provisions must
be reexamined in context.
In Helvering v. Cannon Valley Milling Co. 139 the Eighth Circuit noted
since the war it can now be said that the auditing work of the Bureau of Internal Revenue ispracti-
cally current." JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, SURVEY OF THE ADMINIS-
TRATION OF INCOME AND EXCESS-PROFITs TAXES 2 (1927), reprinted in 98 REVENUE ACTS 1909-
1950, supra note 51 (emphasis in original).
136. The Commissioner stated: "Certainty and simplicity are far more important in a tax mea-
sure than the abstract element of equity.... [Tihe administrative machinery should not be burdened
with the responsibility for distinguishing between taxpayers." Roper, Basis for Reforms of Federal
Taxation, 95 ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 161, 164
(May, 1921).
137. See supra notes 125, 127 and accompanying text.
138. See § 212(b) which provided in part: "The net income shall be computed upon the basis of
the taxpayer's annual accounting period (fiscal year or calendar year, as the case may be) in accord-
ance with the method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the books of such taxpayer;...."
Ch. 18, § 212(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1064-65 (emphasis added). This section represents the first clear
statement in the tax laws that income was to be determined on the basis of annual accounting peri-
ods. See also supra note 47 (quoting § 213(a) and explaining why that section easily could be read as
requiring the administrative simplicity that comes from strict adherence to annual accounting). Ad-
ditionally, § 213 applied to corporate taxpayers through § 233. Furthermore, §§ 214(a)(l)-(3), with
respect to individual taxpayers, and §§ 234(a)(l)-(3), with respect to corporate taxpayers, limited the
deductibility of expenses to those paid or accrued during the "taxable year" in question. Section 200,
in turn, defined taxable year as follows:
The term "taxable year" means the calendar year, or the fiscal year ending during such
calendar year, upon the basis of which the net income is computed under section 212 or
section 232. The term "fiscal year" means an accounting period of twelve months ending
on the last day of any month other than December. The first taxable year, to be called the
taxable year 1918 shall be the calendar year 1918, or any fiscal year ending during the
calendar year 1918.
40 Stat. at 1058.
Thus, the circle was completed as § 200 defined taxable year in a way that referred to an annual
accounting period, or in the words of § 200, "an accounting period of twelve months." Id.
139. 129 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1942).
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departures from strict adherence to annual accounting in the Revenue
Act of 1918.11 One interesting departure so noted by the Cannon Valley
Milling court is found in sections 214(a)(12) and 234(a)(14).14 These
sections permitted both individual and corporate taxpayers to, inter alia,
file claims in abatement with respect to their 1918 taxes for rebates paid
pursuant to contracts entered into during the 1918 tax year, even if those
rebates were paid in a subsequent tax year. If the taxpayer did not file an
abatement claim, but ultimately sustained certain types of losses in 1919
as a result of 1918 transactions, the taxpayer could recognize those losses
by reopening the 1918 tax year rather than by deducting the losses in the
1919 tax year. The House and Senate committee reports are silent as to
the reasons for adopting sections 214(a)(12) and 234(a)(14), which
clearly violate the principle of annual accounting. However, these sec-
tions can easily be interpreted as providing equitable relief from strict
adherence to annual accounting. Income tax rates reached their peak
during the World War I era in the 1918 tax year.42 Thus, the inability
to recognize losses from 1918 transactions at the higher 1918 tax rates
simply because the losses were not fully realized until after the close of
the 1918 tax year would have resulted in a windfall for the government.
Sections 214(a)(12) and 234(a)(14) thus exemplify how Congress pro-
moted equitable treatment of the taxpayer at the expense of administra-
tive simplicity.
An even more instructive example of Congress favoring equitable
treatment of the taxpayer over simplicity in tax administration is the net
operating loss provision. 4 3 Indeed, the Senate Finance Committee Re-
port that accompanied the Revenue Act of 1918 recognized that the pro-
140. Id. at 646 n.3.
141. 40 Stat. at 1068, 1079-80.
142. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
143. See Revenue Act of 1918, § 204(b) which provided:
If for any taxable year beginning after October 31, 1918, and ending prior to January 1,
1920, it appears upon the production of evidence satisfactory to the Commissioner that any
taxpayer has sustained a net loss, the amount of such net loss shall under regulations pre-
scribed by the Commissioner with the approval of the Secretary be deducted from the net
income of the taxpayer for the preceding taxable year; and the taxes imposed by this title
and by Title III for such preceding taxable year shall be redetermined accordingly. Any
amount found to be due to the taxpayer upon the basis of such redetermination shall be
credited or refunded to the taxpayer in accordance with the provisions of section 252. If
such net loss is in excess of the net income for such preceding taxable year, the amount of
such excess shall under regulations prescribed by the Commissioner with the approval of
the Secretary be allowed as a deduction in computing the net income for the succeeding
taxable year.
40 Stat. at 1061.
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vision violated annual accounting"4 but indicated that the desire for the
administrative simplicity of annual accounting must be tempered by eq-
uitable concerns caused by the realities of the business world. The Fi-
nance Committee Report stated: "The chief merit of the present plan [of
strict adherence to annual accounting] is its simplicity of administration.
But it does not adequately recognize the exigencies of business, and,
under our present high rates of taxation, may often result in grave
injustice."' 45
Furthermore, Congress passed the net operating loss provision over
Senator Lenroot's protestations that it violated the principle of annual
accounting. 46 Despite his protestations, Senator Lenroot apparently did
not believe that adherence to annual accounting must never be violated.
Rather, he was seemingly more concerned that the broad scope of the net
operating loss provision would have a deleterious effect on revenue rais-
ing efforts. 4 7 In fact, he indicated that he might support a more nar-
144. Perhaps the statement that the net operating loss provision violated annual accounting
should be clarified. One certainly cannot contend that the net operating loss provision exemplified
pure transactional accounting. Taxpayers could recognize in one year losses that provided no tax
benefit in another year without regard to whether the transactions generating those losses had termi-
nated. Furthermore, the net operating loss provision carried over losses that resulted from netting
the receipts and expenditures arising from many transactions. Thus, the provision was far more an
income averaging provision than it was a transactional accounting provision. Still, by permitting the
taxpayer to recognize losses in a year other than that in which they were realized, the net operating
loss provision violated the principle of annual accounting.
145. SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, REVENUE BILL OF 1918, S. REP. No. 617, 65th Cong., 3d
Sess. 7 (1918) (to accompany H.R. 12863) reprinted in 94 REVENUE ACTS 1909-1950, supra note 51.
The Report continued:
The committee has accordingly incorporated an amendment (sec. 204) which provides that
under certain limitations... a net loss... may be deducted from the net income of the
preceding taxable year, and if it is in excess of the net income for such preceding taxable
year, that such excess may be allowed as a deduction in computing the net income for the
succeeding taxable year. Provision is made for the necessary adjustment of the taxes for
the years involved, and for crediting or refunding to the taxpayer any amounts found due
under such adjustment.
Id.
146. Senator Lenroot, addressing the net operating loss provision, stated:
[This is a very far-reaching amendment, more important than I think many Members
outside of the Finance Committee perhaps realize. It is something entirely new with refer-
ence to a taxation policy in the United States. It proposes instead of treating a taxable year
as a unit to group this into two or three taxable years as the case may be.
57 CONG. REc. 513 (1918).
147. Senator Lenroot stated:
The importance of this provision becomes very apparent when we look into the future and
realize that possibly in the very near future we may have an industrial depression. We may
have, instead of profits upon the part of a very considerable percentage of the industries of
the country, actual losses. Although they may make large profits during the year 1918, we
propose to this extent at least to insure them in future against losses and provide that if
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rowly drafted provision that alleviated the hardships caused by annual
accounting when a particular loss transaction did not close before the
end of a particular taxable year.148 However, the unmistakable tenor of
Senator Lenroot's comments indicated that he did believe that annual
accounting was the foundation of our tax system, and the net operating
loss provision caused unjustifiable damage to that foundation.149 That
Congress passed the net operating loss provision after Senator Lenroot's
clear admonition that it violated the foundation upon which our tax sys-
tem was based substantially undercuts contentions that Congress in-
tended our tax system to be based upon annual accounting.
Senator Lenroot's concern, however, that the net operating loss provi-
sion would have a deleterious effect on revenue raising efforts, did not fall
on deaf ears. As discussed below, the availability of a net operating loss
provision waxed and waned for the first twenty years after its initial pas-
they sustain losses in the future we will pay them back when the taxes have been a revenue
to the Government for the year 1918.
Mr. President, it seems to me that this is clearly wrong and can not be defended, because
the Government must have money to carry on its operations. Taxes must be paid for that
purpose whether business is conducted at a profit or whether it is conducted at a loss. The
excise taxes that are found in this bill are imposed whether the seller is carrying on his
business at a profit or whether it is carried on at a loss ....
[I]t seems to me that if the Senate realized the scope of these sections, realized their
possible effect upon the Treasury of the United States in the future, it would not adopt
them.
57 CONG. REc. 513-14 (1918). Senator Lenroot then asked: "I do not know whether or not the
Finance Committee have any estimates of how much is involved or how much the loss of revenue
will be to this Government, but I should like to ask whether any member of the committee has any
estimate upon that subject?" 57 CONG. REc. 514 (1918).
148. Senator Lenroot noted:
I am wholly in sympathy with the amendment that we have been discussing for the past
hour or two with reference to losses upon inventories and the refund that is there provided;
I can see some justification for making an adjustment in the case of sale of plants acquired
since April 6, 1917, for war purposes, and where a loss has been entailed; but I can see no
justification for applying that principle to ordinary business which is carried on in the
ordinary way. There might be reason for some legislation of this kind if the transaction out
of which a loss occurred began in a taxable year and was not ended or the loss not incurred
until a subsequent taxable year; but what justification can there be when here is a business
during the year 1918 which is making a profit during that entire year, and its business is
closed, and then we come along to the year 1919, and that same business suffers a loss, not
through any transactions which were begun in 1918, but through transactions which were
begun and ended in 1919?
57 CONG. REc. 513-14 (1918).
149. See, for example, Senator Lenroot's statement:
The whole theory of the income-tax law is that a man shall pay taxes each year accord-
ing to the income that he makes that year. That is the theory of the income-tax law; and
this provision would wholly and totally upset that theory and make the basis a three-year
average instead of providing for a tax on the annual income.
57 CONG. REC. 515 (1918).
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sage. However, whenever Congress limited or withdrew the availability
of the net operating loss provision, it did so to protect the federal fisc at
times when economic conditions made revenue raising quite difficult. It
did not do so simply to preserve the concept of annual accounting.
Under the net operating loss provision contained in the Revenue Act
of 1918, the only losses which a taxpayer could carry back or carry for-
ward were losses sustained in a taxable year which began after October
31, 1918, and ended prior to January 1, 1920.'50 Thus, that net operating
loss provision was limited in that it did not apply to net losses incurred
after the end of the 1919 calendar year. With the Revenue Act of
1921,151 Congress decided to revive the net operating loss provision.
However, the 1921 provision applied only to losses incurred in taxable
years beginning after December 31, 1920.152 When read together, the
Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921 permitted net losses incurred in 1919 to
be carried back and carried forward, and net losses incurred in 1921 and
thereafter to be carried forward, but did not permit use of net losses for
the year 1920 to offset income in any other year.
This gap was not accidental. In the Senate hearings on the 1921 revi-
val of the net operating loss provision, Senator McCumber stated that
despite taxpayer requests Congress had previously refused to allow tax-
payers to deduct 1920 losses from the previous year's gain because "the
Government absolutely needed the money." '53 Dr. T.S. Adams, the
noted economist, who acted as an advisor to the Treasury, had only one
reservation about enacting the provision: whether the budget could
"stand the strain." '154 Thus, the lack of a net operating loss provision for
150. See Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 204(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1061 (1919).
151. Ch. 136, 42 Stat. 227 (1921).
152. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 204(b), 42 Stat. 227, 231 (1921).
153. Internal Revenue: Hearings Before the Committee on Finance, on HR. 8245 [Confidential
Print for Use of Members of the Senate] 67th Cong., Ist Sess. at 34 (Sept. 1921), reprinted in 95A
REVENUE AcTs 1909-1950, supra note 51.
154. Id. Adams stated:
While I doubt very much if the Treasury Department could stand for a provision recogniz-
ing losses of 1920, if you can put it off for several years, I think it highly desirable that it
should be done ....
The Treasury Department has considered this very carefully. It would have liked to
authorize deductions for net losses of 1920. That, however, seems impracticable. The de-
partment thinks the House provision is safe. They think this will relieve the taxpayers
eventually, and that by 1923 we shall be able to stand it. The department thinks that
prosperity will have returned by that time and that we can stand the strain; that, in any
event, if these corporations have these losses, it is not fair to tax them heavily in their
prosperous years and then take no account of those years in which they are in red ink.
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losses incurred in 1920 resulted solely from revenue concerns caused by a
temporary economic downturn and not from any concern that a net op-
erating loss provision did not comport with the principle of annual ac-
counting. Moreover, the lack of a sunset provision in the net operating
loss section in the 1921 Act 55 indicates that Congress intended to make
the net operating loss provision a permanent fixture in our tax laws.
Thus, Congress was very willing to forsake the annual accounting con-
cept to achieve equitable treatment of the taxpayer.
Of course, the net operating loss provision of the 1921 Act did not
always lead to results that were entirely satisfactory to Congress or the.
Treasury. As with any new provision, taxpayers learned how to manipu-
late it to achieve results that Congress and the Treasury did not desire.
Thus, the net operating loss provision was renumbered and fine-tuned in
the Revenue Act of 1924.156 In the Revenue Act of 1928, the tax laws
were completely reorganized and the net operating loss provision was
given a new section number.I57 However, with the exception of the fine-
tuning and renumbering, through the Revenue Act of 1928 there was no
indication that the net operating loss provision was anything other than a
well-established fixture in our tax laws.
Then came the Great Depression. Previously, starting with the Reve-
nue Act of 1921, taxpayers who reported net operating losses could carry
those losses forward to the following year. If in that following year the
carried-forward losses still exceeded the income for that year, the tax-
payer could carry forward those losses for one additional year.158 In
155. Unlike the net operating loss provision in the Revenue Act of 1918 which applied only to
losses sustained in a taxable year which began after October 31, 1918, and which ended prior to
January 1, 1920, see Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, § 204(b), 40 Stat. 1057, 1061 (1919), the net
operating loss provision contained in the Revenue Act of 1921 applied to losses sustained in any
taxable year beginning after December 31, 1920. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 204(b), 42
Stat. 227, 231 (1921).
156. In the Revenue Act of 1924, the net operating loss provision was renumbered as § 206.
Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 206 43 Stat. 253, 260 (1924). Section 206(b) clarified that the
amount of net loss carried forward was "not allowable ... as a deduction in computing the net loss
of the succeeding taxable year, since to do this would allow the benefits of the net loss to be taken not
only in the two succeeding taxable years but for an indefinite time until it was absolutely wiped out."
SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, INTERNAL REVENUE BILL OF 1924, S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st
Sess. 20 (1924) (to accompany H.R. 6715) reprinted in 96 REVENUE AcTs 1909-1950, supra note 51.
For other examples of fine-tuning, see STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 68TH CONG., 1ST
SESS., STATEMENT OF THE CHANGES MADE IN THE REVENUE ACT OF 1921 BY H.R. 6715 AND
THE REASONS THEREFORE, 15-17 (Comm. print 1924), reprinted in 67 REVENUE ACTS 1909-1950,
supra note 51.
157. See Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 117, 45 Stat. 791, 825-26 (1928).
158. See Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 204(b), 42 Stat. 227, 231 (1921).
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other words, starting with the Revenue Act of 1921, the tax laws permit-
ted a two year carryforward of net operating losses. The Revenue Act of
1932, the first major tax act passed after the start of the Great Depres-
sion, however, limited loss carryovers to only the following year.159 Ac-
cording to the House Report accompanying the Revenue Act of 1932,
this cutback in the loss carryover provision was necessitated by "the ur-
gent need of revenue."160
With the inauguration of President Roosevelt and the start of the New
Deal, the government needed revenue even more urgently. Thus, in 1933
Congress repealed the net operating loss provision via section 218(a) of
the National Industrial Recovery Act.1 61 Although the Supreme Court
declared portions of the National Industrial Recovery Act unconstitu-
tional in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,162 the holding in that
case was framed so that it did not affect the repeal of the net operating
loss provision.1 63 The net operating loss provision thus remained absent
from the tax laws until it was reinstated in the Revenue Act of 1939.164
A primary purpose of the Revenue Act of 1939 was to stimulate busi-
ness by removing business deterrents from the tax laws. 165 Such legisla-
tion was needed to aid an economy that not only had not yet recovered
from the Great Depression, but which, moreover, had lapsed deeper into
the Depression through a major recession that began in late 1937.166
One would think that at such a time Congress would be unwilling to
reinstate a net operating loss provision with its attendant costs to the
159. See Revenue Act of 1932, ch. 209, § 117(b), 47 Stat. 169, 207 (1932).
160. HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, THE REVENUE BILL OF 1932, H.R. REP. No. 708,
72d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1932) (to accompany H.R. 10236), reprinted in 99 REVENUE ACTS 1909-
1950, supra note 51.
161. National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, § 218(a), 48 Stat. 195, 209 (1933). Section 218(a)
was part of the revenue raising provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act. SENATE COMM.
ON FINANCE, NATIONAL INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY BILL, S. REP. No. 114, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 5
(1933) (to accompany H.R. 5755), reprinted in 99 REVENUE ACTS 1909-1950, supra note 51. ("Sec-
tions 210 to 218, inclusive, cover the taxes necessary to raise $220,000,000.").
162. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
163. The Court stated, "[Wie hold the code [of fair competition (pursuant to which the Live
Poultry Code was promulgated)] provisions here in question to be invalid." Id. at 551.
164. See Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 247, § 211, 53 Stat. 862, 867-69 (1939).
165. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, THE REVENUE BILL OF 1939, H.R. REP. No.
855, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 3 (1939) (to accompany H.R. 6851) reprinted in 105 REVENUE ACTS
1909-1950, supra note 51. ("The bill has two major objectives. The first is to remove from the
existing corporate income-tax structure such business deterrents and tax irritants as may be possible
to consider at this time." Id. at 1. "[O]ne purpose of the bill as reported is to stimulate business
activity." Id. at 3.)
166. See J. WITTE, supra note 59, at 104.
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federal fisc. However, an official of the Chamber of Commerce of the
United States testified before the House Ways and Means Committee and
urged the enactment of a net operating loss provision to alleviate hard-
ships and inequities caused by strict adherence to annual accounting.1 67
The House agreed that reenactment of such an equitable provision was
appropriate, 168 and the net operating loss provision was restored to the
tax laws.
169
In thus reinstating the net operating loss provision Congress again un-
dermined the legitimacy of the exalted status which the Supreme Court
had granted to annual accounting. One must remember that the reason
for annual accounting is to help raise revenue in an administratively con-
venient manner. While this desire for administrative convenience had
always been tempered by a desire for equitable treatment of the taxpayer,
the balance had generally been tipped in favor of administrative conven-
ience when the economy was faltering and revenue raising was impaired.
In 1939, however, when a faltering economy would indicate that the bal-
167. Ellsworth C. Alvord, Esq., Vice Chairman of the Committee on Federal Finance, of the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, testified as follows on June 2, 1939:
We urge that the privilege of carrying forward net operating losses be restored to the
revenue act immediately.
The selection of a single year as the taxable period is admittedly arbitrary, and results in
great hardship to industries and particular companies in which years of profit and loss
alternate. If such companies are taxed in years of profit, without allowance for prior years'
losses, their tax burden is wholly out of proportion to the income actually earned over the
period as a whole. As compared with businesses having a stable income from year to year,
moreover, they are at a severe competitive disadvantage....
The revenue acts from 1921 to 1933 recognized this hardship and permitted a net loss
carry-over. The privilege was abolished in the National Industrial Recovery Act in 1933,
solely by reason of the urgent necessity of protecting the revenues at that time. It has never
been disputed that such a provision is an essential feature of an equitable tax system.
The determination of the carry-over period is necessarily arbitrary. The British income
tax permits losses to be carried forward for 6 years. A shorter period may be desirable for
revenue purposes. In view of the abnormal conditions of the last 10 years and the wide
fluctuation of business activity, incomes, and values we have experienced, a carry-over of at
least 3 years should be allowed.
Revenue Revision, Hearings Before the Comm. on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives,
76th Cong., 1st Sess. 99, 104 (1939) (statement of Ellsworth C. Alvord), reprinted in 23 REVENUE
AcTS 1909-1950, supra note 51.
168, The House Report stated:
In the interest of equity, the committee, in the bill as reported, has recommended an
amendment under which individuals and partners are allowed a 2-year carry-over of losses.
This carry-over is substantially the same as that which was granted to them under the
Revenue Act of 1928.
HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, THE REVENUE BILL OF 1939, H.R. REP. No. 855, 76th
Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1939) (to accompany H.R. 6851), reprinted in 105 REVENUE AcTs 1909-1950,
supra note 51.
169. See Revenue Act of 1939, ch. 247, § 211, 53 Stat. 862, 867-69 (1939).
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ance should have tipped toward administrative convenience, Congress
forsook adherence to a major tool for achieving administrative conven-
ience and opted for an equitable result. Arguably, Congress not only
balanced the need for administrative convenience against the need for
equity, but also desired equity wherever possible and believed that ad-
ministrative convenience, and its tool of annual accounting, were neces-
sary evils that could be forsaken if the cost was not too great. From that
analysis flows the conclusion that the mixed signals from the Revenue
Act of 1918, which spawned the net operating loss provision, were the
natural reactions of an infant income tax system in 1918 and 1919, as it
freed itself from its childlike desire for simplicity and facing a complex
world. The Revenue Act of 1924170 further evidences this maturation
process. The next part of this Article examines that evidence of matura-
tion and the Supreme Court's failure to accept it for what it was-the
further rejection of strict adherence to annual accounting.
III. THE IRONY OF SECTION 200(d): OR HOW WHAT WAS
INTENDED AS AN INCURSION UPON ANNUAL
ACCOUNTING'S DOMAIN ACTUALLY SOLIDIFIED
ITS EXALTED POSITION
So far, this Article has considered deviations from annual accounting
as a means of providing equitable relief to the taxpayer from the harsh
consequences of strict adherence to annual accounting. However, early
on, this Article noted that the goals of the overall statutory and regula-
tory scheme also included protection of the fisc from depletion by tax-
payer manipulation, and equitable treatment of the government. Implicit
in this premise is that strict adherence to annual accounting might at
times unfairly benefit taxpayers, and that deviations from annual ac-
counting are also needed to protect the Treasury from taxpayer manipu-
lation. Indeed, just such a concern led to the enactment of section 200(d)
of the Revenue Act of 1924.171 However, Congress purposely worded
that section broadly enough to benefit taxpayers as well as the Treasury.
In pertinent part section 200(d) of the 1924 Act provided:
The deductions and credits provided for in this title shall be taken for the
taxable year in which "paid or accrued" or "paid or incurred," dependent
upon the method of accounting upon the basis of which the net income is
computed under section 212 or 232, unless in order to clearly reflect the
170. Ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253 (1924).
171. Ch. 234, 43 Stat. 253, 254 (1924).
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income the deductions or credits should be taken as of a different period.172
The House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Com-
mittee both explained the reason for this provision in identical language:
The Revenue Act of 1921 in sections 214(a)(6) and 234(a)(4) authorizes the
Commissioner to allow the deduction of losses in a year other than that in
which sustained when, in his opinion, it is necessary to clearly reflect the
income. The proposed bill extends that theory to all deductions and cred-
its. The necessity for such a provision arises in cases in which a taxpayer
pays in one year interest or rental payments or other items for a period of
years. If he is forced to deduct the amount in the year in which paid, it may
result in a distortion of his income which will cause him to pay either more
or less taxes than he properly should.
173
The last sentence of each Committee's report clearly indicates that Con-
gress intended section 200(d) to provide equitable treatment to both the
Treasury and to taxpayers. However, the reason given by the Commit-
tees' reports for the necessity of section 200(d)-the need to prevent in-
come distortion by the prepayment of expenses-usually related to the
taxpayer's ability to manipulate annual accounting to his benefit and the
Treasury's detriment.
By accelerating deductions the taxpayer could mismatch expenses and
the accounting period over which they generated income, taking the ben-
efit of the time value of money for himself to the detriment of the govern-
ment. This was especially true for accrual basis taxpayers because they
could recognize a deduction before actually incurring the expense that
generated the deduction, if all events fixing ultimate liability for the ex-
penditure had occurred. 74 In fact, the early accrual of a deduction
could work to the detriment of the taxpayer only if the taxpayer's margi-
nal rate was lower in the earlier year of accrual than in the later year of
payment.' 75 Thus, section 200(d) of the 1924 Act can be viewed as an
incursion upon annual accounting's domain to protect the fisc from tax-
172. Id. (emphasis added).
173. HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, THE REVENUE BILL OF 1924, H.R. REP. No. 179,
68th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1924) (to accompany H.R. 6715) and SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE,
INTERNAL REVENUE BILL OF 1924, S. REP. No. 398, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1924) (to accom-
pany H.R. 6715), reprinted in 96 REVENUE ACmS 1909-1950, supra note 51.
174. See United States v. Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, 441 (1926) (established the "all events test"
and upheld the Treasury's position that a tax liability that became fixed in 1916 must be deducted in
1916 even though the tax was neither due nor paid until 1917). See also Dixie Pine Products Co. v.
Commissioner, 320 U.S. 516 (1944) (the deduction for a state tax liability could not be accrued while
the taxpayer was challenging the validity of the state tax because all events which would fix the
liability had not occurred so long as the challenge to the validity of the state tax was pending).
175. Indeed, the taxpayer's (unsuccessful) argument in Anderson, 269 U.S. 422, for recognition
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payer manipulation and to provide equitable treatment to the
government.
Section 200(d), however, was not framed so narrowly that it should be
read as remedying only the problem enumerated in the Committees' re-
ports. Rather, the broad scope of its language suggests that it could be
used to remedy other inequities that result from strict adherence to an-
nual accounting, and that the problem of accounting for prepaid ex-
penses was merely one example of when section 200(d) could play an
equitable role. Indeed, Congress' failure to define the phrase, "unless in
order to clearly reflect the income," indicates that Congress was inviting
the courts to formulate a concept of what constitutes a clear reflection of
income, taking into account equitable considerations along the way.
Furthermore, Congress' handling of the installment sales provisions'76
and initial enactment of a net operating loss provision 177 indicates that its
view of a proper and equitable system of accounting for income need not
adhere strictly to a system of annual accounting. Therefore, read in the
context of the statutory development of a system of accounting for taxes
through a trial and error approach, section 200(d), with its "in order to
clearly reflect the income" exception to annual accounting, appears as an
invitation to courts to violate annual accounting if equity so demands
and if the violation does not impair the administrative feasibility of pre-
dicting and collecting revenues on a regular basis. The Supreme Court's
failure to even acknowledge this interpretation of section 200(d) is part
and parcel of its mishandling of annual accounting.
Before the Supreme Court interpreted the relevant portion of Section
200(d), Congress reorganized the tax statutes and renumbered the sec-
tions. As a result, when the language referred to above as section 200(d)
came before the Court, it appeared in section 43 of the Revenue Act of
1934.178
The Supreme Court interpreted section 43 in Security Flour Mills Co.
of its deduction in the later year 1917 rather than in the earlier year 1916, is readily explained by the
fact that tax rates were much higher in 1917 than in 1916. See supra note 50.
176. See supra notes 106-20 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 143-49 and accompanying text.
178. Ch. 277, 48 Stat. 680, 694 (1934). Section 43 of the Revenue Act of 1934 provided in
pertinent part:
The deductions and credits provided for in this title shall be taken for the taxable year in
which "paid or accrued" or "paid or incurred," dependent upon the method of accounting
upon the basis of which the net income is computed, unless in order to clearly reflect the
income the deductions or credits should be taken as of a different period.
[Vol. 67:165
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v. Commissioner.179 The facts in Security Flour Mills were virtually in-
distinguishable from those in Helvering v. Cannon Valley Milling Co.,180
and the Court granted certiorari in Security Flour Mills to resolve the
split of authority caused by the differing results in those two cases at the
circuit court level."' 1 Because the facts in the two cases were virtually
the same,182 and because the Supreme Court's opinion in Security Flour
Mills is murky, at best, analysis of the cases can be simplified by describ-
ing them in a single hybrid fact pattern drawn from all the opinions in
both cases.
18 3
In 1935 the taxpayer, a flour milling company, was subject to a
processing tax, the accrual of which the taxpayer could deduct in deter-
mining taxable income for income tax purposes, subject to satisfaction of
the all events test. 84 In 1935 the taxpayer included in the contract price
it charged to customers the processing tax that it, the taxpayer, would
owe as a result of each transaction. The invoice did not list the process-
ing tax as a separate item. Rather, the tax was added to and included in
the contract price so that the tax burden was effectively passed on to the
customer. However, all sales contracts clearly noted that the sales prices
included the amount of the processing tax and further indicated that if
the amount of the processing tax changed, the sales prices would simi-
larly change. Thus, were it not for the processing tax, the taxpayer
would have charged less on its contracts in 1935 and would have re-
ported less gross income. Furthermore, if the taxpayer had been able to
accrue an offsetting deduction in 1935 for the processing tax, its taxable
income for that year would have been the same as if it had never charged
its customers for the processing tax in the first place.
However, in 1935 the taxpayer was also challenging the constitutional-
ity of the processing tax. Because of this challenge, the all events test
179. 321 U.S. 281 (1944).
180. 129 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1942).
181. Compare Commissioner v. Security Flour Mills Co., 135 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1943), aff'd
321 U.S. 281 (1944) with Cannon Valley Milling, 129 F.2d 642 (8th Cir. 1942).
182. Note that the circuit court in Security Flour Mills stated, "[Tihe two cases are distinguish-
able." 135 F.2d at 168. However, the attempt by the circuit court in Security Flour Mills to distin-
guish Cannon Valley Milling is totally unconvincing. The analysis in this Article therefore treats the
two cases as factually identical.
183. See generally Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 671 (1941), rev'd 135
F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1943), aff'd 321 U.S. 281 (1944); Cannon Valley Milling Co. v. Commissioner,
44 B.T.A. 763 (1941), aff'd sub nom Helvering v. Cannon Valley Milling Co., 129 F.2d 642 (8th Cir.
1942).
184. See supra note 174.
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required for the accrual of a deduction was not satisfied, so the taxpayer
could not take the deduction in that year.185 Therefore, the taxpayer's
taxable income, as well as gross income, for 1935 was increased by the
amount of the processing tax that was passed on to customers. In 1936,
the processing tax was declared unconstitutional. Although under no
legal obligation to do so, but to maintain goodwill and settle claims by
irate customers, the taxpayer repaid to some of its customers in the years
1936, 1937, and 1938 a portion of the taxes that the taxpayer collected
from them in 1935.
Strict adherence to annual accounting would require the taxpayer to
deduct the repayments in the years they were made, namely 1936, 1937,
and 1938. However, the taxpayer contended that because its 1935 taxa-
ble income would have been substantially lower had it not included the
processing taxes in the 1935 sales prices, and because the sales prices for
1935 were increased only because of the existence of the processing
taxes, 186 it. should be able to amend its 1935 tax return so as to offset its
taxable income for that year with the repayments made in 1936, 1937,
and 1938.187 The taxpayer argued that this violation of annual account-
ing was necessary to clearly reflect the income of 1935 and was author-
ized by section 43 of the Revenue Act of 1934.
Given the choice between interpreting section 43 quite narrowly or
somewhat expansively, the Supreme Court in Security Flour Mills opted
185. See supra note 174.
186. Obviously, the contention that the sales prices for 1935 were increased only because of the
existence of the processing taxes is undercut by the fact that the taxpayer did not repay to its custom-
ers all of the processing taxes that it collected. That the taxpayer did not repay all of the taxes
collected is closely related to the fact that it was not under a legal obligation to repay any of the taxes
collected. Thus, the question arises as to why the taxpayer made the repayments in the first place.
The answer to that question, however, in the view of the Cannon Valley Milling dissent, addressed
whether the repayments were deductible in the first place, not when those repayments, once deemed
deductible, were in fact deductible. Cannon Valley Milling, 129 F.2d at 650 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
However, the IRS conceded that the repayments were deductible. Id. at 644. Furthermore, the
failure to repay some of the collected taxes does not appear to have been relevant to the courts in
deciding the timing issue. Therefore, the failure to repay all of the taxes collected shall be deemed
immaterial for purposes of this analysis.
187. From a practical standpoint, the taxpayer did not want to deduct the payments in the years
they were made because the taxpayer had a net loss for the year 1937, but had taxable income for the
year 1935. See Cannon Valley Milling, 129 F.2d at 647;Security Flour Mills, 135 F.2d at 168 (noting
a net loss for the year 1937). Because the tax laws did not contain a net operating loss carryover
provision for the years in question, see supra text accompanying notes 161-64, recognition of the
repayments as deductible items in 1937, a loss year, would generate no tax benefit and would thus
generate tax on a greater amount than the taxpayer's overall net income during the multi-year period
in question.
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for a very narrow interpretation. It held that section 43 merely applied
to the mismatching of receipts and expenses that would occur if a tax-
payer could deduct in one year all expenses that gave rise to a benefit
over the course of several years. For example, section 43 could preclude
a taxpayer from prepaying and deducting all rent due under a multi-year
lease in the first year of the lease.' The Court rested its conclusion, in
part, on the theory that our tax system was based on annual accounting
and that section 43, therefore, "was not intended to upset [this] well-
understood and consistently applied doctrine."1" 9 In support of its con-
tention that our tax system was based upon annual accounting the Court
cited and quoted from its opinion in Sanford & Brooks.190
Two problems exist with such an approach. First, as discussed above,
the Sanford & Brooks opinion over emphasized adherence to annual ac-
counting through an improperly constrained reading of section 212(b) of
the Revenue Act of 1918.1' Second, and of even greater importance,
Sanford & Brooks involved accounting for income in the tax year 1920,
while the predecessor to section 43 was not enacted until 1924. Thus,
when the Supreme Court spoke of the importance of adherence to annual
accounting in Sanford & Brooks, it did so in the context of a tax statute
that did not contain the broad language of section 43 that indicated that
annual accounting could be violated "in order to clearly reflect the in-
come." Therefore, the Court should have considered the subsequent en-
actment of the predecessor to section 43 as at least undercutting the
precedential value of Sanford & Brooks. The failure of the Court to rec-
ognize this possibility makes its analysis quite weak.' 92
Indeed, the Court's opinion in Security Flour Mills was so inartfully
188. Security Flour Mills, 321 U.S. at 285.
189. Id. at 285-86.
190. Id. at 286.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 76-86 and 122-26.
192. Note that the Court in Security Flour Mills did acknowledge the taxpayer's contention that
the enactment of the predecessor to § 43 should be deemed to have altered the Sanford & Brooks rule
of strict adherence to annual accounting. 321 U.S. at 287. However, the Court's response to the
taxpayer's contention does not withstand careful scrutiny and is in fact very misleading. The Court
stated: "As we said in Dixie Pine Products Co. v. Commissioner, supra, referring to a section identi-
cal with § 43 now under consideration, 'The provisions of the Revenue Act of 1936 worked no
significant change over earlier Acts respecting the permissible basis of calculating annual taxable
income.'" 321 U.S. at 287.
Dixie Pine Products Co. v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 516 (1944), addressed the general rule of
when an obligation has sufficiently accrued under the all events test to be deductible by an accrual
basis taxpayer. The specific issue in that case was whether an accrual basis taxpayer could take a
deduction for state taxes when the taxpayer was contesting the validity of the state tax. The Court
Washington University Open Scholarship
216 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 67:165
drafted that it seems as much an opinion on whether a deduction has
accrued as it is on whether annual accounting may be violated. In its
confusion, the Court improperly applied precedent dealing with when a
deduction accrues pursuant to the all events test to the question of
whether annual accounting could be violated. 193 Only an examination of
the circuit court opinions in Security Flour Mills and Cannon Valley
Milling brings into proper focus the legal issue at stake.
The Tenth Circuit, in Security Flour Mills, quoted the committee re-
ports that accompanied section 200(d) of the Revenue Act of 1924,111 the
predecessor of section 43, and construed section 43 quite narrowly. It
read the committee report examples of problems resulting from prepaid
interest and rents as the only types of situations to which section 43
could legitimately apply. 195
Such a reading of section 43, however, ignored the possibility that the
committee report examples were merely intended to illustrate only two of
a wide variety of situations to which the predecessor to section 43 could
held that no deduction was allowed while the challenge to the state tax was proceeding, because all
events fixing the ultimate liability for the tax had not occurred.
Section 43, on the other hand, was relevant only after a determination was made that an obligation
had in fact already sufficiently accrued. Only then did section 43 address whether a taxpayer could
recognize the accrued obligation in the year that it had accrued or, instead, in some other year in
order to clearly reflect income.
Nowhere in Dixie Pine Products did the Court interpret a statute "identical with § 43." The Court
did note the existence of § 43, but the statement in Dixie Pine Products quoted by the Security Flour
Mills Court merely stood for the proposition that nothing in the Revenue Act of 1936 changed the
general rule of when a deduction had sufficiently accrued under the all events test. The language in
the quote, "the permissible basis of calculating annual taxable income," simply referred to how one
calculates taxable income under the permissible annual method known as accrual. Interpreting the
quoted language in any other way takes it out of context and gives it a totally unintended meaning.
To imply, as did the Security Flour Mills Court, that Dixie Pine Products is even remotely helpful in
interpreting § 43 both grossly misrepresents the holding and issue in Dixie Pine Products and im-
properly applies precedent regarding when an obligation has sufficiently accrued to the separate issue
of when, if ever, annual accounting may be violated.
193. See supra note 192.
194. 135 F.2d at 168. See also supra text accompanying note 173 (quoting and discussing the
committee reports).
195. 135 F.2d at 168. The court stated:
It is manifest that Congress had in mind for application of the provision only instances in
which a taxpayer receives income or makes expenditures in one year which are attributable
to or related to business operations extending over a number of years.... The provision
comes into operative play in instances of that kind. It was never intended to go beyond
that scope. These transactions were not of that kind. All of the income was fully earned in
1935. No part of it extended over a period of years. The expenditures were not for inter-
est, or rental, or other items of that kind covering a period of years.
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apply. A broader interpretation of section 43, and its predecessor, is sup-
ported by the broad language of the section itself which lacks any indica-
tion that Congress intended section 43 to have limited application. 196
The Eighth Circuit in Cannon Valley Milling noted that section 43 was
worded broadly enough to cover many more situations than those men-
tioned in the committee reports. 197 The Eighth Circuit also noted the
trial and error nature of the tax laws' development and viewed section 43
as fitting within an overall congressional attempt to balance the need for
administrative convenience with the desire for equity. The Cannon Val-
ley Milling court stated:
Federal income tax legislation is a progressive growth based upon develop-
ing experience. Several distinct levels of growth are evident. One of these
concerns us here. While an annual period has always been maintained as
the normal basis for taxation, experience soon developed that injustice
would result in some instances from a strict adherence thereto. This experi-
ence led the Congress to provide departures from this annual basis in speci-
fied situations for the purpose of avoiding injustice. 198
The court recognized, however, that because section 43 represented a
departure from a general rule of adherence to annual accounting, the
judiciary must impose limits on the section's scope. Furthermore, be-
cause deviation from annual accounting could impair the administrative
feasibility of predicting and collecting revenues, the court realized that its
test had to balance the need for administrative convenience against the
desire for equity. The Eighth Circuit therefore stated its test (to be im-
posed on a case-by-case basis) to require not only "some relation between
a deductible item and a business transaction in some year other than the
one in which it was paid" but also a situation in which strict adherence to
annual accounting would cause a "distortion of the income of the tax-
payer for one or both years, which would amount to an injustice either to
the taxpayer or to the Government."' 99 The dissenting opinion from the
196. See supra text accompanying notes 175-76.
197. Cannon Valley Milling, 129 F.2d at 645.
198. Id. at 646 n.3.
199. Id. at 645-46 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). The opinion states:
To construe this clause broadly to cover all instances where there is merely some relation
between a deductible item and a business transaction in some year other than the one in
which it was paid or finally accrued would introduce an uncertainty seriously interfering
with the practical administration of tax statutes. Clearly, no such general disturbance of
the system was contemplated by section 43. Therefore, such relationship alone is not
enough. There must be, in addition to such relationship, a situation which clearly con-
vinces that unless such deduction item is transferred there would be a distortion of the
income of the taxpayer for one or both years, which would amount to an injustice either to
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Tenth Circuit's decision in Security Flour Mills, however, did the best job
in applying the Cannon Valley Milling test to the facts in the two cases.
The Security Flour Mills dissent stated:
Obviously, these payments had absolutely no relation to the cost of earning
income in the years of payment. Equally apparent is the fact that they had
direct relation to the taxpayer's 1935 gross income. They represented re-
funds to vendees of amounts paid to the taxpayer in 1935 as a part of the
sale price of flour because of the processing tax. They, in fact, resulted in a
reduction of taxpayer's gross income from 1935 sales. Only by relating
them to the year 1935 can the income for that year be truly reflected. It
seems to me that it was to relieve against just such a situation that Sec. 43
was enacted.
200
Indeed, by noting that income for the year 1935 would be clearly re-
flected only if the payments in the later years were used to offset 1935
income, the dissenting judge, in countenancing a violation of annual ac-
counting, both furthered the goals of annual accounting itself and pro-
moted equitable treatment of the taxpayer. Annual accounting can
achieve its goal of enhancing the predictability of the revenue flow only if
the income reported for each year clearly and accurately reflects the ulti-
mate income resulting from activities during that year. By proposing to
the taxpayer or to the Government. We think the guide for construction of this "unless"
clause is that it comprehends those exceptional situations where it is necessary to transfer a
deduction item in order to avoid such a distortion of income as would produce an injustice.
It is this guide we apply to the fact situation here.
Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
200. Security Flour Mills, 135 F.2d at 170 (Phillips, J., dissenting). A similar approach is found
in the Board of Tax Appeals opinion in Cannon Valley Milling:
"Taxation is an intensely practical matter, and laws in respect of it should be construed
and applied with a view of avoiding, so far as possible, unjust and oppressive conse-
quences." Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. State of Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204, 212. The objec-
tive of all accounting methods is to "clearly reflect income." The ideal method would be to
charge against income earned during a taxable period the expenses attributable to the earn-
ing of it. The computation of net income upon the basis of a taxpayer's annual accounting
period in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed does not always
accomplish the desired objective. Section 43 was intended to aid in accomplishing it.
While no limitation was placed upon its application, we are of the opinion that it was
intended to apply to unusual and exceptional situations such as we have here. It is quite
unlikely that this petitioner will ever again make, or be called upon to make, any reim-
bursements of the kind here involved. They were of a nonrecurring nature and resulted
primarily from a judicial decision that the act imposing the processing tax was invalid.
They could not have been foreseen on June 30, 1935, the end of petitioner's fiscal year.
They, however, represented payments under claims relating to 1935 sales. If such sales had
not been made there would have been no basis for the claims and no reimbursements.
They were not in any sense of the word related to sales made in 1937 and were not proper
charges against the income of that year.
Cannon Valley Milling, 44 B.T.A. at 771.
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permit the 1935 income to be offset by the later years' repayments, the
dissenting judge was proposing an interpretation of section 43 that would
more clearly reflect the ultimate income of both 1935 and the years of
repayment, thus giving the Treasury a more accurate historical picture to
use in predicting future revenue flows.
When read together, the Eighth Circuit opinion in Cannon Valley
Milling and the dissent from the Tenth Circuit's decision in Security
Flour Mills represent a highly sophisticated approach to interpreting sec-
tion 43. Not only did they recognize the historical trial and error devel-
opment of the tax statutes during the early years of the income tax, but
they also attempted to place section 43 within this history. Furthermore,
they interpreted section 43 in a manner that balanced the policy goal of
providing equitable treatment to the taxpayer and the government
against the policy goal of predicting and collecting revenue in an admin-
istratively feasible manner. In the light of these truly sophisticated opin-
ions, it is quite lamentable that the Supreme Court in Security Flour Mills
delivered a murky and weak opinion that rigidly adhered to the principle
of annual accounting.
This is not to say that the result reached by the Supreme Court in
Security Flour Mills was totally unjustified. A narrow and quick reading
of the committee reports supporting section 200(d), the predecessor to
section 43, could easily lead to the result reached by the Supreme Court.
In fact, the Tenth Circuit opinion in Security Flour Mills is a creditable
opinion based upon such a narrow and quick reading of section 43 and
the committee reports supporting its predecessor. The position taken in
this Article is simply that the opinion of the Eighth Circuit in Cannon
Valley Milling and the dissent from the Tenth Circuit decision in Security
Flour Mills more accurately interpret section 43 in the historical context
of the overall statutory and regulatory scheme and the policies which
that scheme was seeking to both further and balance.
In light of the fact that the Supreme Court had available to it both of
these sophisticated opinions, how can we explain the Court's weak opin-
ion that not only rigidly adhered to annual accounting, but also failed to
even acknowledge the cogent arguments raised by each of these other
opinions? Perhaps the answer lies in the era in which the Court decided
Security Flour Mills. Security Flour Mills was decided in 1944, in the
midst of World War II. By 1942, revenue needs for the war effort were
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quite pressing.20 1 As a result, Congress raised taxes in 1942.202 How-
ever, the act which raised taxes was quite complicated,2 °3 and by 1944
Congress was concerned with simplifying a tax code that had become
difficult to administer.2' One can readily imagine that in such a climate
the Court would not be amenable to arguments for a sophisticated bal-
ancing approach in order to further equity, but would instead do
whatever it could to embrace bright-line tests that would facilitate ad-
ministration of the tax system.
Analyzed in this way, Security Flour Mills bears a striking similarity to
Sanford & Brooks, which was decided in the depths of the Depression.
Because revenue needs were also pressing when the Court decided San-
ford & Brooks,205 both cases may represent the favoring of administrative
convenience over equitable concerns out of a desire to aid in the collec-
tion of revenue. One might well posit that the supremacy of annual ac-
counting resulted not from the provisions of the underlying statutory and
regulatory scheme, but instead from the accident of the eras in which the
Court interpreted that scheme. If that is the case, Security Flour Mills
presents a great irony. The Court in that* case analyzed a statute that
countenanced the violation of annual accounting in very broad terms.
By construing that statute quite narrowly, the Court indicated an unwill-
ingness to accept congressional attempts at limiting annual accounting's
status. The net result was to so solidify annual accounting's exalted sta-
tus that courts would continue to seek adherence to annual accounting,
even during periods of less pressing revenue needs.
IV. RECOVERIES OF PREVIOUSLY DEDUCTED ITEMS AND
REPAYMENTS OF PREVIOUSLY INCLUDED ITEMS: A CASE
STUDY AND SUGGESTION FOR REFORM
Our inquiry now comes full circle back to the first regulations requir-
ing strict adherence to annual accounting. These regulations involved
the recovery of previously deducted bad debts2" 6 and the inability to use
expenses incurred in one year to offset income received in another
201. See J. WrrrE, supra note 59, at 114.
202. Id. at 115-18.
203. Id. at 118.
204. Id. at 122-23.
205. The Court decided Sanford & Brooks in 1931. For a discussion of the pressing revenue
needs at that time see supra text accompanying notes 157-69.
206. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
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year.20 7 We return to these regulations for several reasons. First, strict
adherence to the principles flowing from these regulations exemplifies
how inequitable results can be reached when courts blindly follow annual
accounting. Second, the courts validated at least one of the underlying
regulations, the recovery regulation, without any consideration of
whether it comported with the mix of policies evidenced by the overall
statutory and regulatory scheme. Instead, the courts applied an unso-
phisticated analysis that relied in part on the supremacy of annual ac-
counting as indicated by the Sanford & Brooks case. Although the
unsophisticated analysis may well have resulted from the taxpayer's lack
of clean hands in the validating case, from that time forward the princi-
ples flowing from those regulations developed a life of their own, di-
vorced from their regulatory underpinnings and the history and context
surrounding those regulations. Third, a re-examination of the recovery
regulation in the context of the history surrounding the overall statutory
and regulatory scheme of accounting for income indicates that a sweep-
ing validation of the regulation may not have been appropriate and the
law need not have developed as it did. Finally, a proposal for modifying
the approach of these strict annual accounting regulations, which better
balances the need for administrative convenience against the desire for
equity, could bring one aspect of current law into harmony with the poli-
cies that emanate from the history of the overall statutory and regulatory
scheme. Such a proposal could also indicate to the courts that our tax
accounting system is a hybrid one that need not always comport with
annual accounting. If the courts would accept this indication, tax juris-
prudence might become more realistic by focusing on the truly important
issues.
The inquiry will proceed in the following manner. First, it will note
how the timing of the final affirmation of the principles flowing from
these early regulations, and the manner in which these principles were
affirmed, indicate that these principles developed a life of their own, sepa-
rate and apart from their history and regulatory underpinnings. Next,
this Article will critique the validation of one of the underlying regula-
tions and the principles flowing from it. Finally, it shall examine a pro-
posal that properly balances the desire for equity and the need for
administrative convenience and which might assist in attaining a more
realistic tax jurisprudence.
207. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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A. How Final Affirmation of the Principle Flowing From the Early
Regulations Indicates That They Developed a Life of Their
Own
The first regulations requiring strict adherence to annual accounting
were promulgated by the Treasury during World War I. As demon-
strated earlier, during this era the government faced pressing revenue
needs and the Treasury lacked experience in administering an income
tax. These factors may have caused the Treasury to put its concern for
equity to one side in order to ease the burden of administering the in-
come tax.20 8 However, final judicial affirmation of the principle behind
these strict annual accounting regulations occurred in periods without
such pressing revenue needs.
In 1967 the Court of Claims decided Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v.
United States.20 9 In 1967 a federal deficit existed, but it was a much
lower percentage of the Gross National Product (GNP) than it was when
the Treasury first promulgated the recovery regulation.210 Yet the court
in Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. held that the tax consequence of recover-
ing a previously deducted item was to include in income in the year of
recovery the amount that gave rise to a tax benefit in the year of deduc-
tion, even if changes in tax rates caused more tax to be due in the year of
recovery than was saved in the year of deduction. Similarly, in 1951,
when the Supreme Court decided United States v. Lewis,2"1 the federal
deficit was again a much lower percentage of the GNP than it was during
World War 1.212 Yet, in Lewis the Court strictly applied the concept of
annual accounting and held that a taxpayer who repaid an amount in
1946 that he had included in income under a claim of right in 1944 could
merely deduct the repayment in 1946. This rule applied even though,
due to a change in tax rates, the taxpayer still paid more tax than if he
had never received the repaid item in the first place.
In both cases, the inequitable nature of the result was duly noted: in
Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. by the court, 213 and in Lewis by Justice
Douglas in dissent. 2 "a However, this recoguition of inequity did not pre-
208. See supra notes 58-70 and accompanying text.
209. 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
210. See J. WrrrE, supra note 59, at 151 for a graphic depiction of federal expenditures and
receipts as a percentage of GNP from 1913 to 1980.
211. 340 U.S. 590 (1951).
212. See supra note 210.
213. 381 F.2d at 403 n.5.
214. 340 U.S. at 592 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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elude strict adherence to annual accounting. One must ask, therefore,
why these courts, at a time of no administrative or deficit crisis, strictly
applied annual accounting principles that flowed from regulations
adopted to achieve administrative convenience at a time of pressing reve-
nue needs.
The easy and expected answer would be that the regulations did not
constitute an unreasonable interpretation of the underlying statutory re-
quirement of accounting for income on an annual basis. Because the
courts almost always uphold Treasury regulations that constitute reason-
able interpretations of a statutory provision,215 courts should also uphold
principles flowing logically and consistently from such reasonable regula-
tions. Curiously, however, neither Lewis nor Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp.
made any reference to the regulations that espoused the principles with
which they were dealing.216 Rather, both the Lewis court and the Alice
Phelan Sullivan Corp. court relied simply on case law flowing from San-
ford & Brooks as authorizing and requiring strict adherence to annual
accounting.217 Thus, the real answer to our inquiry appears to be that
the Sanford & Brooks opinion created such a strong foundation for strict
adherence to annual accounting218 that courts failed to balance equitable
215. See Commissioner v. South Texas Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496 (1948). The Court stated:
"[Tlhis Court has many times declared that Treasury regulations must be sustained unless unreason-
able and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes and that they constitute contemporaneous
constructions by those charged with administration of these statutes which should not be overruled
except for weighty reasons." Id. at 501.
216. Note that the court in Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. did make reference to the regulations
under § 111 of the Code. 381 F.2d at 402. These regulations, and indeed § 111 pursuant to which
they were promulgated, by implication do support the principles flowing from the recovery regula-
tion. However, the Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. court did not cite either § 111 or the regulations
pursuant to it for the proposition that Congress had placed its imprimatur on the principles flowing
from the recovery regulation. Rather, the court merely noted that § 111 and the regulations pursu-
ant to it placed certain limits upon unbridled application of the recovery principles with which the
court was dealing. 381 F.2d at 401-02. From a careful reading of the case, one could infer that the
basic recovery principle itself found its genesis in case law and not in any regulatory provision. See
381 F.2d at 401 where the court cites case law for the statement, "[Tihe principle is well ingrained in
our tax law that the return or recovery of property that was once the subject of an income tax
deduction must be treated as income in the year of its recovery." The opinion nowhere cites to the
true parent of that principle, namely the recovery regulation, even though to this day the recovery
regulation's provisions remain in the Treasury regulations without any material change. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.451-1(a) (1988) ("To the extent that income is attributable to the recovery of bad debts for
accounts charged off in prior years, it is includable in the year of recovery... regardless of the date
when the amounts were charged off.").
217. Lewis, 340 U.S. at 592; Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp., 381 F.2d at 403.
218. For evidence of the strength of the foundation created by Sanford & Brooks, see supra Part
III where this Article describes how the Court improperly used Sanford & Brooks in Security Flour
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concerns against the administrative convenience of adherence to annual
accounting by the time of the Lewis and Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp.
decisions.219
Furthermore, the strength of the Sanford & Brooks opinion obviated
the need for reference to the regulations that gave rise to the principles in
question. Because neither Lewis nor Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. evalu-
ated the underlying regulations when upholding the principles that
flowed from them, it is appropriate that at least one of the regulations,
the recovery regulation, be evaluated here.
Because regulations should be evaluated in the context of the underly-
ing structures, policies, and principles of the income tax system as a
whole and in the light of the conditions to which those regulations were a
response,22 ° the recovery regulation must not be deemed valid merely
because it constitutes a reasonable interpretation of the requirement that
income be accounted for on an annual basis. Rather, the recovery regu-
lation must be evaluated in the light of the era in which it was adopted
and with an eye toward whether, in a different era, it properly accommo-
dates the sometimes conflicting goals of the overall statutory and regula-
tory scheme. Under this approach, if the recovery regulation
unnecessarily promotes administrative convenience at the expense of eq-
uity, it should not be upheld and should be replaced by a more balanced
approach. 22 ' An examination of how courts early on validated the recov-
ery regulation demonstrates that their approach was flawed, and so is not
sufficient to foreclose our inquiry.
Mills to limit the applicability of a statute that authorized incursions upon annual accounting's
domain.
219. During the era of Lewis and Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. one case did forsake annual ac-
counting in order to achieve an equitable result. Perry v. United States, 160 F. Supp. 270 (Ct. Cl.
1958). However, the Perry opinion was so bizarre that the Court of Claims was able to overrule
Perry in Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. 381 F.2d at 401-03. See, Grauer, supra note 3, at 379-81.
220. See supra note 14.
221. If my position here places me in conflict with contrary Supreme Court authority (see supra
note 215), so be it. By now it should be obvious to the reader that one purpose of the study encom-
passed by this Article and by my previous Article, Grauer, supra note 3, is to demonstrate and try to
repair certain jurisprudential errors that the Supreme Court has made in the tax field. The reader
should not be surprised, therefore, if the repair process includes adopting a new methodology for
evaluating the validity of Treasury regulations. In any event, as noted supra note 14, this methodol-
ogy is merely an extension to the field of regulatory interpretation and evaluation of the positions
taken by Dean Calabresi and Professor Zelenak in the area of statutory interpretation and validation.
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B. The History of the Validation of the Recovery Regulation
First of all, it is not entirely clear when the recovery regulation was
first validated. Professor White finds the first validation in 1927222 in Lee
v. Commissioner.z23 Although the Board of Tax Appeals in Lee did in-
lude in income in the year of recovery accounts receivable that the tax-
payer had written off as worthless in earlier years, the taxpayer did not
appear to challenge the validity of the underlying principle of the recov-
ery regulation. Rather, the taxpayer contended that the amount included
in income in the year of recovery should be offset by additional accounts
receivable that had proved worthless in that later year. Thus Lee did not
address the validity of the recovery regulation (which the taxpayer had
apparently conceded) but rather the worthlessness of the accounts receiv-
able that the taxpayer attempted to write off in the later year of recov-
ery.224 As a result, one cannot really say that the Lee decision validated
the recovery regulation.
The confusion as to the initial validation of the recovery regulation is
further noted by Professor Bittker who stated:
[A]s late as 1929, the Board of Tax Appeals seemed uncertain about the
validity of a Treasury regulation providing that the collection of a debt pre-
viously charged off as worthless must be included in income. Within a few
months, however, the Board of Tax Appeals accepted the principle enunci-
ated by this regulation; by 1931, it was described as a principle that "seems
to be taken for granted, as indeed it must be"; and it has been a basic part of
the federal income tax structure ever since.225
Professor Bittker found that the Board of Tax Appeals accepted the prin-
ciple enunciated by the recovery regulation in Excelsior Printing Co. v.
Commissioner.226 In Excelsior Printing Co., however, the issue was not
the validity of the principle enunciated by the recovery regulation but
rather whether the payment received in the later year, pursuant to a pro-
vision in the debtor's will, should be regarded as a taxable receipt of a
previously deducted bad debt or as a nontaxable receipt of a gift or be-
quest. Furthermore, even Putnam National Bank v. Commissioner,227
the case cited by Professor Bittker as describing the principle of the re-
222. White, supra note 1, at 489 n.16.
223. 6 B.T.A. 541 (1927), aff'd sub nora. Carr v. Commissioner, 28 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1928).
224. 6 B.T.A. at 544.
225. Bittker & Kanner, The Tax Benefit Rule, 26 UCLA L. REv. 265, 266 (1978) (citations
omitted).
226. 16 B.T.A. 886 (1929).
227. 50 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1931).
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covery regulation "as a principle that 'seems to be taken for granted, as
indeed it must be,' "228 did not address the validity of the recovery regu-
lation or its principle, but rather considered whether the taxpayer had
properly taken the deduction in the earlier year.2 29 In fact, none of the
cases cited by either Professor Bittker or Professor White as validating
the recovery regulation actually held that the recovery regulation was a
valid exercise of the Treasury's rulemaking authority.230 Indeed, it was
not until after the Supreme Court's Sanford & Brooks decision that the
Board of Tax Appeals clearly stated that the principles of annual ac-
counting and the administrative finality sought by the statute of limita-
tions required that the recovery of previously deducted bad debts (and
other amounts) must be reflected in income only in the year of recov-
ery.23 Even then, the Board made no reference to the underlying Treas-
ury regulation, and it is not clear that the Board's statement was
necessary to the decision in the case.
Ironically, the only case in which any court appears to have clearly
stated that the recovery regulation was a valid exercise of the Treasury's
rulemaking authority is the circuit court decision which reversed the
Board of Tax Appeals case cited by Bittker232 as indicating uncertainty
about the recovery regulation's validity. In that case, Commissioner v.
Liberty Bank & Trust Co.,233 the taxpayer claimed certain amounts as
bad debt deductions for the years 1916, 1917, 1918 and 1919. The re-
turns for those years were audited, and the deductions were allowed.234
When the taxpayer recovered those bad debts in 1920 and 1921, the tax-
payer did not include the recoveries in income. The taxpayer claimed
that the debts were not in fact worthless when they were charged off and
228. Bittker & Kanner, supra note 225, at 266 (quoting Putnam Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 50
F.2d 158, 158 (5th Cir. 1931)).
229. If the deduction in the earlier year had been improper, as the taxpayer contended, the
remedy would have been to reopen the earlier year rather than to include the payment in income in
the later year.
230.' The only case cited by Professor Bittker or Professor White as upholding the principle of
the recovery regulation not discussed in the text of this Article is Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry.
Co. v. Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. 988 (1928), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 47 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1931),
cerL denied, 284 U.S. 618 (1931). See White, supra note 1, at 489 n.16. In that case, too, the issue
revolved not around the validity of the recovery regulation, but instead around the definition of
income. See Chicago Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Commissioner, 13 B.T.A. at 1022-23.
231. South Dakota Concrete Products Co. v. Commissioner, 26 B.T.A. 1429, 1431-32 (1932).
232. Bittker & Kanner, supra note 225, at 266 n.5.
233. 59 F.2d 320 (6th Cir. 1932), rev'g Liberty Insurance Bank v. Commissioner, 14 B.T.A. 1428
(1929).
234. Liberty Ins. Bank, 14 B.T.A. at 1431.
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therefore the deductions were improper. The taxpayer argued that
proper remedy was to amend the returns for the earlier years. The Board
of Tax Appeals agreed with the taxpayer. 25 However, because the stat-
ute of limitations had expired for reopening those earlier years, the Board
held that those returns need not be amended. Furthermore, on a theory
akin to "two wrongs do not make a right," the Board held that the Com-
missioner could not correct the improper deductions of the earlier closed
years by re-computing the tax liability for the recovery years.236 As a
result, the Board held that the taxpayer did not have to account for the
recovered debts in any year.2 37
The Commissioner appealed, asserting that the taxpayer should be es-
topped from claiming that the debts were not in fact worthless when they
were charged off, inasmuch as the taxpayer had earlier sworn that the
debts were worthless and obtained a tax benefit as a result.238 The Sixth
Circuit agreed with the Commissioner, noting, "It is the duty of the tax-
payer to deal fairly and truthfully with the government. '239 This state-
ment by the Sixth Circuit best explains the appeals court result in Liberty
Bank.
Once the taxpayer was estopped from claiming that the debts were
never worthless, the debts were assumed to have indeed been worthless.
235. Id. at 1433-34.
236. The Board's approach as to when the proper remedy is the reopening of the earlier year and
when the proper remedy is an inclusion in the year of recovery was correct under strict annual
accounting principles. If a taxpayer properly charges off an item in an earlier year but recovers it in
a later year, the earlier year should not be reopened because the taxpayer properly accounted for that
year based upon all the facts known at that time. Instead, annual accounting requires that the
taxpayer make an adjustment in the year of recovery. An earlier year should be reopened only if it
was reported incorrectly based on the facts known at that time. Thus, if the charge-off in the earlier
year was improper, given the facts known at that time, the taxpayer should amend the return for the
earlier year to correct the mistake, regardless of whether the improperly charged off item is recov-
ered at a later date. Such an approach comports with strict annual accounting principles in that
each year's return accurately reflects the events of that year as determined by the facts known during
that year. Annual accounting would be violated and income for each year would not be accurately
reflected if mistakes on returns for earlier years could be "corrected" by counterbalancing entries in
the returns for later years. Thus, so long as the Board was willing to accept the taxpayer's conten-
tion that it never should have taken the deductions in the first place, the Board was correct in not
requiring (or even permitting) the correction of that earlier error in a later year. However, it is
questionable whether the Board even should have entertained the taxpayer's argument that the de-
ductions were improperly taken in the earlier years, especially after the taxpayer had sworn that they
were properly taken, the statute of limitations on those years had expired, and those years could not
be reopened. See infra text accompanying note 238.
237. Liberty Ins. Bank, 14 B.T.A. at 1434.
238. Liberty Bank, 59 F.2d at 325.
239. Id.
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Thus, their subsequent recovery had to be accounted for in the year of
recovery under the strict annual accounting approach of the recovery
regulation. The court then validated the recovery regulation, stating first
that Sanford & Brooks indicated the validity of the regulation2 40 and stat-
ing further:
Like regulations were promulgated under corresponding provisions of the
Revenue Acts of 1916 and 1918 (39 Stat. 756; 40 Stat. 1057), and with these
earlier regulations in effect Congress enacted sections 213(a) and 233(a) of
the Revenue Act of 1921 in substantially the same language as the earlier
acts. The same language was incorporated into the succeeding Revenue
Acts of 1924, 1926, and 1928. It must be taken as settled that Congress was
cognizant of the interpretation which the Treasury Department had put on
the Revenue Acts of 1916 and 1918, and yet, with that interpretation ex-
tant, the provisions to which it applied were re-enacted in 1921. If such
interpretation had not been consonant with the intent of Congress, it is
reasonable to suppose that it would have modified this construction in the
act of 1921, or in the later acts.241
The court thus affirmed the validity of the recovery regulation on the
following theory: If the recovery regulation had not accurately reflected
Congressional intent, Congress would have amended the statutory basis
for the regulation to correct the Treasury's mistake. Here, however,
Congress affirmatively reenacted the statutory basis for the regulation,
without any change, after the regulation had been promulgated. Thus,
the regulation must reflect how Congress intended recoveries of bad
debts to be accounted for.
This particular rationale, however, when viewed in connection with
the facts in Liberty Bank, makes Liberty Bank a weak precedent in other
fact patterns for the validity of the recovery regulation and the principles
flowing from it. Although some Supreme Court authority supports the
view that administrative construction of a statutory provision is deemed
to have Congressional approval when Congress reenacts the underlying
statute without material change,242 important and quite relevant qualifi-
cations limit this approach to validating regulations.
In Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co.,243 the Court refused to hold
punitive damages nontaxable even though the Board of Tax Appeals had
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. See Commissioner v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678, 681-82 (1965); United States v. Dakota-
Montana Oil Co., 288 U.S. 459, 466 (1933).
243. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
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earlier held them to be nontaxable, and Congress had reenacted the un-
derlying statute without change after the Board's decision. In refusing to
apply the "reenactment theory" the Court stated, "Re-enactment-par-
ticularly without the slightest affirmative indication that Congress ever
had the [Board's] decision before it-is an unreliable indicium at
best." 2" Then, in SE. C. v. Sloan,245 the Court applied this limitation on
the reenactment theory in a challenge to an administrative agency's or-
der. The Court refused to uphold the SEC's construction of section
12(k) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,246 even though Congress
had substantially reenacted that section after the SEC had interpreted
it.247 Moreover, in United States v. Correll,248 the Court upheld a Treas-
ury ruling on the reenactment theory, but only after noting that Congress
had focused upon and evaluated the existing ruling before reenacting the
underlying statute without change.249
On the other hand, the legislative history of each of the acts cited in
Liberty Bank as reenacting the statutory authority for the recovery regu-
lation contains absolutely no evidence that Congress ever considered or
evaluated the recovery regulation or its ramifications when it reenacted
the underlying statutory provision. As a result, the reenactment theory
was "an unreliable indicium at best"25 in determining the validity of the
recovery regulation. A better indicium would have been an evaluation of
whether the recovery regulation properly balanced the need for adminis-
trative convenience against the desire for equity that was evidenced by
244. Id. at 431.
245. 436 U.S. 103 (1978).
246. 15 U.S.C. § 781(k) (1982).
247. 436 U.S. at 120-21. The Court stated:
[A] contemporaneous administrative construction of an agency's own enabling legislation
"is only one input in the interpretational equation. Its impact carries most weight when
the administrators participated in drafting and directly made known their views to Con-
gress in committee hearings." Here the administrators, so far as we are advised, made no
reference at all to their present construction of § 12(k) to the Congress which drafted the
"enabling legislation" here in question-the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. They made
known to at least one Committee their subsequent construction of that section 29 years
later, at a time when the attention of the Committee and of the Congress was focused on
issues not directly related to the one presently before the Court. Although the section in
question was re-enacted in 1964, and while it appears that the Committee Report did rec-
ognize and approve of the Commission's practice, this is scarcely the sort of congressional
approval referred to in Zuber, supra.
Id.
248. 389 U.S. 299 (1967).
249. Id. at 305-06 n.20.
250. See supra note 244 and accompanying text.
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the overall trial and error approach to tax accounting taken by Congress
and the Treasury during the early years of the income tax.
Unfortunately, the facts in Liberty Bank did not lend themselves to
such an approach. The taxpayer in Liberty Bank, as the appeals court
had noted, did not deal fairly with the government.251 Liberty Bank had
tried unfairly to manipulate to its advantage the interplay between strict
adherence to annual accounting and the statute of limitations by taking
inconsistent positions at opportune times.252 Thus, unlike the taxpayer
in Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp., Liberty Bank lacked clean hands and
could not convincingly argue that strict application of the recovery regu-
lation was inequitable in that it would work an injustice upon the tax-
payer.25 3 The appeals court in Liberty Bank was therefore able to uphold
the recovery regulation as a reasonable interpretation of a statutory pro-
vision without being concerned about the potential for inequitable results
in other factual situations. There is evidence, however, that had the tax-
payer not lacked clean hands, the result could have been different, and
better balanced the desire for equity against the need for the administra-
tive convenience of annual accounting.
As late as 1941 the Board of Tax Appeals stated that with respect to
the recovery of previously deducted taxes, the general rule was that the
taxpayer should amend the year of deduction to eliminate the deduction,
rather than include the recovered tax in income in the year of recov-
ery.254 The taxpayer was to include the recovered tax in income in the
year of recovery only if the statute of limitations precluded amendment
of the year of deduction.2 5 Furthermore, the Board of Tax Appeals ap-
parently approved of amendment of the earlier year even when the de-
duction was properly taken in the earlier year.25 6 Thus, with respect to
the recovery of previously deducted taxes, the Board, by requiring the
251. See supra text accompanying note 239.
252. See supra notes 234-37 and accompanying text.
253. In Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967) strict applica-
tion of the principles flowing from the recovery regulation did work an injustice upon the taxpayer.
In that case, the taxpayer made a charitable contribution and saved almost $1900 in taxes as a result.
Some years later, when the taxpayer's marginal tax rate was substantially higher, the charity recon-
veyed the donated property to the taxpayer. Because of the change in the applicable marginal rate,
the recovery resulted in a tax of almost $4500 being assessed against the taxpayer. Thus, the tax-
payer would have been better off by some $2600 ($4500 minus $1900) had it never made the charita-
ble contribution in the first place.
254. E.B. Elliott Co. v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 82, 91 (1941).
255. Id.
256. See Id. at 93.
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amendment of an earlier return that had been properly filed, forsook
strict adherence to annual accounting 57 in favor of equitable treatment
of the taxpayer and the government. Whenever the statute of limitations
for amending returns had not expired, the approach of the Board of Tax
Appeals to recovered taxes put both the taxpayer and the government in
the same position that they would have been in (except for the effects of
the time value of money) had the recovered taxes never been paid and
deducted in the first place. Neither party inequitably gained a windfall at
the expense of the other simply because of a change in the taxpayer's
marginal tax rate.
The Board's approach to recovered taxes had another appealing as-
pect. Although it countenanced a violation of annual accounting, the
violation should not have undermined the government's ability to predict
and collect revenues in an administratively feasible manner. Because rev-
enue flows should be most predictable when the historical picture accu-
rately reflects the ultimate income resulting from the activities
transpiring in each earlier year, the requirement that the year of deduc-
tion be amended should further predictability by providing a more accu-
rate historical picture. Furthermore, by permitting amendment of an
earlier year's return only so long as the statute of limitations had not
expired, the Board apparently recognized that for past returns to have
any predictive value they must be finalized and not subject to amendment
after a reasonable period of time. Additionally, permitting amendment
only so long as the statute of limitations had not expired recognized that
the vast majority of adjustments would be required because of the short
duration of an annual accounting period and the need for adjustment
would likely become known relatively soon after the annual accounting
period had ended. Those that became known later (after the statute of
limitations had expired) would be fewer and more far between. Thus,
although they were treated differently than adjustments that became
known within the statute of limitations, their differing treatment should
not, to any substantial degree, have impaired a clear reflection of income
or the ability to predict and collect future revenues by reference to the
historical picture.
If the Board's approach to recovered taxes is so appealing, why was
that approach not taken to recovered bad debts? Certainly no evidence
exists that the courts were concerned that I.R.S. personnel would become
257. See supra note 236.
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inundated with amended returns or that taxpayers would rebel against
having to file amended returns when the recovery was de minimus in
nature. Rather, the courts most likely took a different approach to the
recovery of bad debts because there was a specific regulation dealing with
them. However, there is no principled justification for treating recovered
bad debts differently from recovered taxes. Thus, one approach had to
yield to the other, and it was the approach to recovered taxes that finally
gave way.258 The approach to recovered taxes yielded to the approach to
bad debt recoveries not because of any principled balancing of the desire
for equity against the need for administrative convenience but instead
because of the decision of the Supreme Court in Security Flour Mills. 259
Unfortunately, as we have already seen, the opinion of the Supreme
Court in Security Flour Mills was itself somewhat flawed.26 It, too,
failed to balance the desire for equity against the need for administrative
convenience and failed to consider the trial and error nature of Congress'
and the Treasury's approach to accounting period issues. If one does,
however, take into account the trial and error nature of the early ap-
proach to accounting period issues (and the context in which the recov-
ery regulation was promulgated), one can make a plausible argument
that the courts should not have upheld the recovery regulation's validity
when its inequitable features became evident.
The recovery regulation (along with the complementary regulation
which precluded a taxpayer from using expenses incurred in one year to
offset income received in another) was promulgated by the Treasury dur-
ing World War I. At that time not only were revenue needs quite press-
ing, but moreover, the Treasury lacked experience administering an
income tax.26 a Thus, at that time, regulations that aided administrative
convenience, even at the expense of equity, were appropriate. Nonethe-
less, both at that time and thereafter, Congress and the Treasury indi-
cated that, whenever possible, the tax laws would be administered so as
to provide both equitable treatment to the taxpayer and the government.
258. See, eg., Bartlett v. Delaney, 173 F.2d 535, 540 (Ist Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 817
(1949) ("We think the rule of tax accounting applied in the Elliott [supra note 254 and accompany-
ing text] and Leach cases is no longer tenable in view of the decision in Security Flour Mills v.
Commissioner."). See also Taylor Instrument Companies v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 388 (1950) (the
Tax Court refused to continue its approach to recovered taxes laid down in Elliott after the Supreme
Court decision in Security Flour Mills).
259. See supra note 258.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 187-201.
261. See generally supra Part II(A).
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Evidence of this desire for equity is found in the methods of account-
ing for long term contracts (the completed contract method and the per-
centage of completion method), 262 the installment sales provisions, 263
and, of course, the net operating loss provisions.264 Indeed, a review of
the early history of the net operating loss provisions indicates that when-
ever they were not available to taxpayers, it was not because of a desire to
adhere to annual accounting but rather because of pressing revenue
needs.265 Finally, in 1924, Congress authorized the violation of annual
accounting if doing so was needed to clearly reflect income.2 66
The Eighth Circuit's opinion in Cannon Valley Milling, a sophisticated
interpretation of a successor to this 1924 provision, stated that the provi-
sion authorized the violation of annual accounting to preclude the distor-
tion of the income of the taxpayer for one or both of the years in
question.267 Even though this statutory provision did not address when
items must be included in income,26 its principle that annual accounting
could be violated in order to preclude distortion of the taxpayer's income
for one or both of the years in question should be equally applicable to
how and when the recovery of previously deducted items must be ac-
counted for. Amendment of the earlier year of deduction provides a
more accurate historical picture of the ultimate income from activities
transpiring in that earlier year than does inclusion of the recovery as
income in the later recovery year. Similarly, because the recovery in the
262. See supra Part II(B)(1).
263. See supra Part II(B)(2).
264. See supra notes 143-70 and accompanying text.
265. See supra text accompanying notes 149-70.
Even to this day it appears that when Congress limits the availability of an equitable provision that
violates annual accounting, it does so not to preserve annual accounting as a concept or to even
promote administrative convenience at the expense of equity, but rather to preserve revenues. For
example, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 more or less repealed the use of the completed contract
method of accounting and limited taxpayers to the percentage of completion method or the "per-
centage of completion--capitalized cost method". Congress did this not because the completed con-
tract method involved transactional accounting or violated annual accounting, but rather because
the deferral of taxes caused by the completed contract method was costing the Treasury too much in
revenues. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., IST SESS., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT Or 1986 (H.R. 3838, Pub. L. No. 99-514) 527, 530 (Joint
Comm. Print 1987). (U.S. Gov't. Printing Office Publication reproduced in CCH Standard Federal
Tax Reports, Extra Edition No. 19, May 8, 1987 (CCH Special 24)). In fact, even the alternatives
which the 1986 Act provided to replace the completed contract method could not be described as
adhering to annual accounting principles.
266. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
267. Cannon Valley Milling, 129 F.2d at 646. See also supra note 199 and accompanying text.
268. The statute in question dealt only with the timing of deductions.
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later year resulted only from the payment or accrual in the earlier year,
the income picture for activities transpiring in that later year is more
accurately reflected if it does not include the recovery. Therefore,
amendment of the earlier year's return precludes distortion of the histori-
cal picture of the income for both the year of deduction and the year of
recovery and comports with the Eighth Circuit's interpretation of the
1924 statutory provision.
Thus, viewed in the context of both Congress' and the Treasury's con-
temporaneous and subsequent emphasis on equity and a subsequent stat-
utory provision that could be interpreted as authorizing violations of
annual accounting to preclude income distortions, the recovery regula-
tion appears as an outdated relic from a time when administrative con-
venience was sorely needed. Although the recovery regulation remained
a reasonable interpretation of one statutory.provision, by the time it was
validated in the Liberty Bank case, its rigid application of annual ac-
counting principles failed to comport with the overall tenor of the statu-
tory and regulatory scheme.269
Unfortunately, however, the taxpayer in Liberty Bank had acted so
unfairly toward the government that the case did not confront the court
with the inequities that the recovery regulation could cause. In fact, the
taxpayer's questionable behavior could have induced the Liberty Bank
court to blindly apply the reenactment theory without regard to whether
Congress had considered the recovery regulation or its ramifications dur-
ing the reenactment process. Furthermore, the tax years in Liberty Bank
preceded enactment of the statutory provision that indicated annual ac-
counting could be violated to preclude a distortion of income. But these
explanations for the Liberty Bank decision only make it more unfortu-
nate that after Liberty Bank the validity of the recovery regulation was
269. Perhaps the propriety of basing a portion of this argument on the Eighth Circuit's approach
which was ultimately rejected by the Supreme Court in Security Flour Mills deserves some explana.
tion. At the time that Liberty Bank was decided neither the Eighth Circuit opinion in Cannon
Valley Milling nor the Supreme Court decision in Security Flour Mills had been handed down. How-
ever, by the time of the Liberty Bank case, the statutory and regulatory scheme that the Eighth
Circuit analyzed in Cannon Valley Milling was already in place. Furthermore, Congress did not pass
the predecessor to current section 111, which accepts the basic principle of the recovery regulation
but injects some equity into the result, see infra text accompanying note 278, until well after the
Liberty Bank decision. Therefore, because Cannon Valley Milling better accounted for the overall
tenor of the statutory and regulatory scheme than did Security Flour Mills, see supra Part III, an
approach similar to that found in Cannon Valley Milling would certainly have been appropriate at
the time of Liberty Bank.
[Vol. 67:165
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol67/iss1/6
1989] AN ANALYSIS OF INCOME TAX ANNUAL ACCOUNTING 235
never really challenged.27 ° Moreover, its validation may have reinforced
the myth of the supremacy of annual accounting, thus making it virtually
impossible for the Eighth Circuit's sophisticated interpretation of the
1924 congressional enactment to survive in the Supreme Court.271
One further irony surrounding the validation of the recovery regula-
tion should be noted. The Liberty Bank case and the Putnam National
Bank case, which stated that the principle of the recovery regulation
'seems to be taken for granted, as indeed it must be,'' 2 were both de-
cided during the depths of the Depression. This Article has explained
that the Supreme Court decided Sanford & Brooks at that time and that
revenue needs were then quite pressing. 273 It has further noted that the
Court decided Security Flour Mills during World War II when not only
were revenue needs pressing, but also the tax code was becoming difficult
to administer.2 74 Thus, one could argue that the supremacy of annual
accounting resulted not from the provisions of the statutory and regula-
tory scheme, but rather from the accident of the eras in which the Court
interpreted that scheme.27 5 Perhaps now, given the timing and the fact
pattern in the Liberty Bank case, the conclusion can be reached that the
supremacy of annual accounting resulted both from the eras in which
courts faced accounting period issues and from the factual patterns in the
cases that came to the courts.
The supremacy of annual accounting did not result from any intention
on the part of Congress or the Treasury to require strict adherence to
annual accounting. Indeed, Congress and the Treasury desired just the
opposite. They appeared to view annual accounting more as a necessary
evil for predicting and collecting revenues in an administratively feasible
manner. When the cost was not too great, annual accounting was for-
saken for further equity.
C. A Modest Proposal for Reform
Section 1341 of the current Code276 further evidences Congress' desire
270. Indeed, even prior to Liberty Bank the validity of the recovery regulation was treated as
beyond challenge by the Fifth Circuit, even though it had never been formally evaluated by a court.
See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 179-201.
272. Putnam National Bank v. Commissioner, 50 F.2d 158, 158 (5th Cir. 1931).
273. See supra notes 157-70, 205 and accompanying text.
274. See supra text accompanying notes 201-04.
275. See supra text accompanying note 205.
276, I.R.C. § 1341 (West Supp. 1988).
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for equitable treatment of the taxpayer. Congress enacted this provision
in 1954 as a response to the Supreme Court decision in Lewis.2 77 Lewis
had held that a taxpayer who repaid some $11,000 in 1946 that he had
included in income in 1944 under a claim of right could do no more than
take a deduction of $11,000 in 1946, even though the tax paid on the
inclusion in 1944 exceeded the tax saved by the deduction in 1946. Sec-
tion 1341 gives the taxpayer another option when the amount repaid ex-
ceeds $3,000. For the year of repayment the taxpayer can either deduct
the repayment, as under Lewis, or can forgo the deduction and credit his
taxes with the amount by which the earlier inclusion had previously in-
creased his taxes. Thus, aside from lost interest on the taxes earlier paid,
the taxpayer is never worse off, if the amount repaid exceeds $3,000, than
he would have been had he not initially received the repaid amount and
included it in income.
Section 1341, however, provides more than just equity to the taxpayer.
It can also provide him with a windfall. If the taxpayer's marginal rate is
higher in the year of repayment than in the year of inclusion, he will
choose the deduction and reap a greater tax savings in the year of repay-
ment than the tax liability incurred in the year of inclusion. Thus, sec-
tion 1341 fails to provide equity to the government.
Another problem with section 1341 arises because it treats the repay-
ment of previously included items differently from the recovery of previ-
ously deducted items. Section 111278 still applies the principle of the
recovery regulation but reduces the amount includable in the year of re-
covery by any portion of the earlier deduction that did not provide a tax
reduction. Thus, a change in the taxpayer's marginal rate will often pre-
clude the taxpayer from being placed in the same position that he would
have been in had he never taken the deduction. The differing statutory
treatment of the recovery of previously deducted items from the statu-
tory treatment of the repayment of previously included items has been
277. United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951).
Both the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committee Reports that accompanied the
passage of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 specifically noted that § 1341 produced a result differ-
ent from that in the Lewis case. See HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE OF 1954, H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (to accompany H.R. 8300), reprinted in
1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEwS 4017, 4436; SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE OF 1954, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (to accompany H.R. 8300), reprinted in 1954 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4621, 5095.
278. I.R.C. § 111 (West Supp. 1988).
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subjected to criticism.279
The proposal noted in the Introduction to this Article2 0 suggests a
uniform transactional solution to the disparate treatment of recoveries of
previously deducted items and the repayment of previously included
items. That proposal would require the taxpayer to amend the earlier
year to account for the later recovery or repayment whenever the amount
recovered or repaid exceeded $3,000. Furthermore, to account for time
value of money problems, it would require that interest be paid by the
paying party in both cases on the amount of taxes that were either paid
or refunded.28 ' In this manner equity would be served by placing both
parties in the same position that they would have been in had the trans-
actions, which in effect were reversed, never occurred. Indeed, the re-
quirement that an adequate rate of interest be paid would preclude either
party from even gaining a windfall from the time value of money. In
reaching this conclusion the proposal recognized that exceptions to an-
nual accounting have become so prevalent in the tax code that this trans-
actional approach should not really be deemed that shocking.282
A current step toward balancing the policy goals of annual accounting
against other goals found in the statutory and regulatory scheme could
involve a somewhat similar approach. The approach would be reminis-
cent of the old treatment of the Board of Tax Appeals to the recovery of
previously deducted taxes. It would require the taxpayer to amend the
earlier year if: (1) the earlier year and the later year were within five
years of one another; and (2) the tax liability differential between reopen-
ing the earlier year and adhering to annual accounting (as limited by
section 111) exceeded $1,000 in the case of an individual taxpayer and
$2,500 in the case of a corporate taxpayer. If either of these two require-
ments were not satisfied, current law, i.e., the recovery regulation, as lim-
ited by section 111, and the Lewis treatment of claim of right
restorations, would apply. However, section 1341 (with its provision of
benefits only to taxpayers) would be repealed. If the earlier year were to
be reopened because the tax liability differential exceeded the threshold
and the two years were within five years of one another, interest would of
course be due from the paying party in order to compensate the repaid
party for the loss of the time value of the money.
279. See Note, supra note 18.
280. See supra text accompanying note 18.
281. Note, supra note 18, at 1019-20.
282. Id. at 1018.
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This approach takes the equity inherent in the pure transactional ap-
proach suggested by the earlier proposal and tempers it with some practi-
cal considerations. It should first be noted that this approach imposes a
statute of limitations, but not to relieve the IRS from having to assign too
many personnel to process amended returns. As the processing of
amended returns becomes more and more computerized, the administra-
tive inconvenience of processing more amended returns should not be
that great. This approach, however, imposes a statute of limitations to
recognize the need to finalize returns after a reasonable period of time.
Finalized returns have better predictive value than do returns that are
always subject to amendment. Furthermore, taxpayers should only be
required to retain old returns for a reasonable period of time. Addition-
ally, the amendment of an earlier year's return might require the amend-
ment of the returns for all the intervening years, for example, because of
a change in a loss carryover. Thus, a limit on how far back a taxpayer
must go to amend a return protects a taxpayer from the inconvenience of
also having to amend the returns for an inordinate number of intervening
years.
The imposition of a statute of limitations, in fact, furthers the goal of
equity as well as the goal of administrative convenience. While amend-
ment of the earlier year's return, with an interest component added in, is
an attempt at returning the taxpayer and the government to their initial
positions, the longer time passes, the more difficult it becomes to return
the parties to initial positions. Furthermore, the accruing of interest over
an extended period of years could run up such a high interest liability
that the paying party would be begging for the "equity" of the vicissi-
tudinal effects of marginal rate fluctuations that inhere in strict adher-
ence to annual accounting. Thus, the earlier year should be reopened
only if it is not too far distant from the later year.
A five-year limitations period has been chosen because it falls between
the usual statute of limitations of three years2 3 and the statute of limita-
tions of six years whenever there is a substantial understatement of in-
come by the taxpayer.2 4 Because of the latter statute, a taxpayer is well
advised to retain tax records and returns for at least six years. A require-
ment that a taxpayer amend returns that are more than five years old
may create a substantial burden on the taxpayer. The prospect of having
to amend the returns for all intervening years could be quite onerous, and
283. See I.R.C. §§ 6501(a), 6511(a) (West Supp. 1988).
284. See I.R.C. § 6501(e) (West Supp. 1988).
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the interest that could accrue over a six-year period could be quite sub-
stantial. By the same token, a three-year limitation period may be too
short to provide enough benefit. With any period of limitation, quite a
few recoveries or repayments may occur shortly after the period expires,
thus denying equity in those situations. The shorter the period, the
greater the numbers of such inequitable applications. On the other hand,
the longer the time period between the earlier year and the later year, the
more likely it is that a dramatic enough change in a taxpayer's marginal
rate would occur to justify reopening the earlier year for the sake of eq-
uity. Thus, this new proposal adopts a limitations period that falls in
between the usual three-year period and the substantial underpayment
six-year period.
The imposition of a threshold figure for triggering amendment of the
earlier year's return is based solely on practical considerations. If every
recovery or repayment within a five-year period required the reopening
of the earlier year, the transaction costs of amending returns could well
outweigh the equitable benefits of placing the parties as near as is possible
to their initial positions. A threshold is therefore proposed so that the
transaction costs of amending returns would not be incurred when the
tax consequences were de minimis.
This threshold is substantively different from those found in section
1341 and in the earlier proposal. Those thresholds are based upon the
amount repaid or recovered. However, it would be almost a fruitless
exercise for a taxpayer to reopen an earlier year even if the amount re-
paid or recovered were very large, if in both years the taxpayer was in the
same or almost the same tax bracket. This could especially occur at the
present time with tax brackets compressed since the Tax Reform Act of
1986. The tax liability differential between reopening the earlier year and
adhering to annual accounting (as limited by section 111) could be too
small to justify the transaction costs of amending the earlier returns.
Thus, the threshold posited here revolves around the differential between
the tax that would change hands if the earlier year were reopened and the
tax that would change hands if annual accounting (as limited by section
111) were applied.
The threshold figures of $1,000 for individual taxpayers and $2,500 for
corporate taxpayers are a best estimate as to the average costs that would
be incurred by both individual and corporate taxpayers if they were
forced to amend returns of earlier years. The threshold figures therefore
reflect not only my belief that placing the parties in their original posi-
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tions is justified only when the benefits of doing so exceed the costs of
doing so, but also my belief that the cost of amending an individual's tax
returns is generally not as great as the cost of amending a corporation's
tax returns. These thresholds, of course, could be periodically adjusted
for inflation.
The foregoing proposal would, of course, require congressional action.
Mere judicial recognition that Security Flour Mills did not sufficiently
account for either the trial and error approach of Congress and the
Treasury toward accounting periods or Congress' and the Treasury's ap-
parent desire to promote equity, even at the expense of annual account-
ing, will not suffice. The proposal is too specific in its detail to be
appropriate as a judicidial pronouncement. Also, since Security Flour
Mills, Congress has enacted section 1341. Additionally, section 111,
which was enacted well after Liberty Bank, but just prior to the Supreme
Court decision in Security Flour Mills, runs counter to the result pro-
posed here. Furthermore, the current version of the statute scrutinized
in Security Flour Mills is sufficiently different in wording from its earlier
counterpart that it might not be open to the interpretation suggested here
for the earlier version.28 5 Finally, of course, as tax practitioners do ap-
preciate bright line tests, a carefully drafted congressional enactment ap-
pears to be the only acceptable approach.
Such a reform in the tax law might not be an item of high priority for
285. The current counterpart to the statute interpreted in Security Flour Mills is now found in
§§ 461(a) and 446(a)-(c) of the Code. Section 461(a) provides, "The amount of any deduction or
credit allowed by this subtitle shall be taken for the taxable year which is the proper taxable year
under the method of accounting used in computing taxable income." I.R.C. § 461(a) (West Supp.
1988). Sections 446(a)-(c) provide:
(a) General rule - Taxable income shall be computed under the method of accounting
on the basis of which the taxpayer regularly computes his income in keeping his books.
(b) Exceptions - If no method of accounting has been regularly used by the taxpayer, or
if the method used does not clearly reflect income, the computation of taxable income shall
be made under such method as, in the opinion of the Secretary, does clearly reflect income.
(c) Permissible methods - Subject to the provisions of subsections (a) and (b), a taxpayer
may compute taxable income under any of the following methods of accounting -
(1) the cash receipts and disbursements method;
(2) an accrual method;
(3) any other method permitted by this chapter; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing methods permitted under regulations prescribed
by the Secretary.
I.R.C. §§ 446(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1988).
Thus, the emphasis of the statutory language now is simply on reporting deductions and credits in
accordance with a consistently applied method of accounting, and the statute does not provide for
reporting a particular item during the period in which reporting that particular item would most
clearly reflect income.
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Congress at the present time. Problems with the deficit make revenue
raising a greater concern than the providing of equity. However, sooner
or later Congress must admit that the most sensible way to reduce the
deficit is to raise tax rates above the artificially low levels at which they
were set by the 1986 Act.28 6 When rates are increased and the deficit is
reduced, the equitable problems discussed in this Article will be both
accentuated and ready for cure.
The enactment of a proposal like the one suggested here could also
have a beneficial effect upon tax jurisprudence. The 1986 Act contains
even further evidence that Congress does not consider the concept of an-
nual accounting to be sacrosanct. The attack on tax shelters through the
passive loss limitation rules287 is but another example of the abandon-
ment of strict adherence to annual accounting. Adoption of a proposal
such as the one posited here could send another signal to the courts-
evaluate tax issues according to whether they: (1) promote equitable
treatment of the taxpayer and the government, (2) do not unduly impair
the ability of the Treasury to predict and collect revenues in an adminis-
tratively feasible manner, and (3) do not permit depletion of the fisc by
taxpayer manipulation. Do not evaluate tax issues according to whether
the result reached promotes a shibboleth such as "annual accounting."
CONCLUSION
Over the course of the twentieth century the myth has developed that
our income tax system is based upon annual accounting. This myth
gains support if one cursorily examines some key statutory and regula-
tory provisions. 288 However, a more thorough examination of the overall
statutory and regulatory scheme for accounting for income, together
with an examination of the circumstances surrounding the development
of that scheme, leads to the following conclusion. The supremacy of an-
nual accounting developed in spite of efforts by Congress and the Treas-
286. In advocating an increase in tax rates, I am not necessarily advocating a return to the pre-
1986 Act rate schedule. Rather, I am advocating that rates be sufficiently high that we do not need
to distort the proper tax base with revenue enhancers such as I.R.C. § 67 (two percent floor on
miscellaneous itemized deductions). This section, added by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 132,
Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2113-15, can cause more than just income to be taxed by disal-
lowing a deduction to employees for the first two percent of unreimbursed expenses incurred in the
furtherance of some income producing activities.
287. See I.R.C. § 469 (West Supp. 1988) as added to the Code by § 501(a) of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085, 2033-41 (1986).
288. See supra text accompanying notes 10-13.
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ury to temper the role that it had to play. It was the courts that
overemphasized adherence to annual accounting, and they did so by fail-
ing to consider the ramifications and history of the overall statutory and
regulatory scheme with which they were dealing. We should not, how-
ever, judge the courts too harshly. The eras in which the key cases arose,
and the fact patterns of some of those cases, precluded the courts from
recognizing the folly of their ways until it was too late.289 A modest
congressional response, such as the one proposed here, would comport
with the original intent of Congress in developing our tax accounting
system and could resolve a few of the equitable problems that have re-
sulted from strict adherence to annual accounting. Additionally, it could
indicate to courts that they should take a more realistic approach to tax
jurisprudence and not be concerned with having results comport with a
concept called annual accounting.
289. For some evidence of recognition of the inequitable folly, combined with resignation that it
was too late for a court to resolve the problem, see Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381
F.2d 399, 403 n.5 (Ct. Cl. 1967).
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